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Abstract
This thesis consists of five essays on evolutionary dynamics.
In Chapters 1 and 2, we study the evolution of trust from the perspective of game theory. In
the trust game, two players have a chance to win a sum of money. The "investor" begins with one
monetary unit. She gives a fraction of that unit to the "trustee." The amount she gives is multiplied by
a factor greater than one. The trustee then returns a fraction of what he receives to the investor. In a
non-repeated game, a rational trustee will return nothing. Hence, a rational investor will give nothing.
In behavioral experiments, however, humans exhibit significant levels of trust and trustworthiness.
Here we show that these predispositions may be the result of evolutionary adaptations. We find that
when investors have information about trustees, investors become completely trusting and trustees
assume the minimum level of trustworthiness that justifies that trust. "Reputation" leads to efficient
outcomes as the two players split all the possible payoff from the game, but the trustee captures
most of the gains: "seller" reputation helps "sellers" more than it helps "buyers." Investors can
capture more of the surplus if they are collectively irrational: they can demand more from trustees
than is rational, or their sensitivity to information about trustees can be dulled. Collective investor
irrationality surprisingly leads to higher payoffs for investors, but each investor has an incentive to
deviate from this behavior and act more rationally. Eventually investors evolve to be highly rational
and lose the gains their collective behavior had earned them: irrationality is a public good in the trust
game.
Next, we describe two evolutionarily robust mechanisms for achieving efficient outcomes that
favor the investor while still compensating trustees for the value of their agency. In the first mech-
anism, "comparison shopping," investors compare limited information about various trustees before
committing to a transaction. Comparing just two trustees at the beginning of each interaction is
enough to achieve a split desirable to the investor, even when information about trustees is only
partially available. In the other mechanism, a second layer of information is added so that trustees
sometimes know what rates of return investors desire. The trust game then becomes similar to an
ultimatum game, and positive investor outcomes can be reached once this second type of information
is sufficiently pervasive.
In Chapter 3, we study the origin of evolution and replication. We propose "prelife" and "prev-
olution" as the logical precursors of life and evolution. Prelife generates sequences of variable length.
Prelife is a generative chemistry that proliferates information and produces diversity without replica-
tion. The resulting "prevolutionary dynamics" have mutation and selection. We propose an equation
that allows us to investigate the origin of evolution. In one limit, this "originator equation" gives
the classical selection equation. In the other limit, we obtain "prelife." There is competition be-
tween life and prelife and there can be selection for or against replication. Simple prelife equations
with uniform rate constants have the property that longer sequences are exponentially less frequent
than shorter ones. But replication can reverse such an ordering. As the replication rate increases,
some longer sequences can become more frequent than shorter ones. Thus, replication can lead to
"reversals" in the equilibrium portraits. We study these reversals, which mark the transition from
prelife to life in our model. If the replication potential exceeds a critical value, then life replicates
into existence.
We continue our study of replication in Chapter 4, taking a more concrete, chemistry-oriented
approach. Template-directed polymerization of nucleotides is believed to be a pathway for the repli-
cation of genetic material in the earliest cells. Adding template-directed polymerization changes the
equilibrium structure of prelife if the rate constants meet certain criteria. In particular, if the basic
reproductive ratio of sequences of a certain length exceeds one, then those sequences can attain high
abundance. Furthermore, if many sequences replicate, then the longest sequences can reach high
abundance even if the basic reproductive ratios of all sequences are less than one. We call this phe-
nomenon "subcritical life." Subcritical life suggests that sequences long enough to be ribozymes can
become abundant even if replication is relatively inefficient. Our work on the evolution of replication
has interesting parallels to infection dynamics. Life (replication) can be seen as an infection of prelife.
Finally, in Chapter 5, we study the emergence of complexity in early biochemical systems. RNA
biochemistry is characterized by large differences in synthetic yield, reactivity to polymerization, and
degradation rate, and these properties are believed to result in pools of highly homogeneous, low com-
plexity sequences. Using simulations of prebiotic chemical systems, we show that template-directed
ligation and the mass-action effect of sequence concatenation increase the average complexity and
population diversity in pools of RNA molecules. We verify these theoretical results with experiments
showing that ligation does enhance complexity in real RNA systems. We also find a correlation be-
tween predicted RNA folding energy and complexity, demonstrating the functional importance of
this measure. These results contrast with previous assumptions that fine-tuning of the system is the
only way to achieve high complexity. Our work shows that the chemical mechanisms involved in
nucleic acid polymerization and oligomerization predispose the RNA world towards a diverse pool
of complex, energetically stable sequences, setting the stage for the appearance of catalytic activity
prior to the onset of natural selection.
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Evolutionary game theory
Chapter 1
Irrationality as a public good in the trust game
Michael L. Manapat, David G. Rand, and Martin A. Nowak
Abstract In the trust game, two players have a chance to win a sum of money. The "investor" begins
with one monetary unit. She gives a fraction of that unit to the "trustee." The amount she gives is
multiplied by a factor greater than one. The trustee then returns a fraction of what he receives to the
investor. In a non-repeated game, a rational trustee will return nothing. Hence, a rational investor
will give nothing. In behavioral experiments, however, humans exhibit significant levels of trust and
trustworthiness. Here we show that these predispositions may be the result of evolutionary adaptations.
Using the methods of evolutionary game theory, we find that when investors have information about
trustees, investors become completely trusting and trustees assume the minimum level of trustworthi-
ness that justifies that trust. "Reputation" leads to efficient outcomes as the two players split all the
possible payoff from the game, but the trustee captures most of the gains. Put another way, "seller"
reputation helps "sellers" more than it helps "buyers." Investors can capture more of the surplus if they
are collectively irrational: they can demand more from trustees than is rational, or their sensitivity to
information about trustees can be dulled. Collective investor irrationality surprisingly leads to higher
payoffs for investors, but each investor has an incentive to deviate from this behavior and act more
rationally. Eventually investors evolve to be highly rational and lose the gains their collective behavior
had earned them: irrationality is a public good in the trust game.
1.1 Introduction
Trust is an essential component of social and commercial interactions. When individuals make pur-
chases online, they trust that sellers have not misrepresented the characteristics of the goods and that
they will actually ship the items. When pension funds, university endowments, and retail investors
transfer money to investment management organizations, they trust that the managers will fulfill
their fiduciary obligations and handle the funds properly. (A number of recent scandals have shown
that this trust can be misplaced, with devastating consequences.) In general, whenever a principal
employs an agent to perform some task, the principal must trust the agent to execute the task in a
manner consistent with the principal's interests. Trust has important implications for the efficiency of
society (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Fukuyama, 1995). As Kenneth Arrow put it, trust is "an important
lubricant of a social system" (Arrow, 1974).
In this paper, we study the evolution of trust by analyzing the trust game (Kreps, 1990; Berg
et al., 1995; Malhotra, 2004). There are two players, an "investor" and a "trustee." The investor
begins with one monetary unit. She then gives a fraction p, 0 < p < 1, to the trustee. That amount
is multiplied by b, b > 1, so the trustee receives pb in total. The trustee then returns a fraction q,
0 < q 1, to the investor. In total, the investor's payoff is 1 - p + bpq and the trustee's payoff is
bp(1 - q). The parameter p is a measure of how "trusting" the investor is. The parameter q is a
measure of how "trustworthy" the trustee is. A "trusting" investor hands over a large fraction of
her initial endowment. A "trustworthy" trustee returns a sum of money that is larger than what the
investor initially gave. The trust game allows us to study the evolution of trust game-theoretically.
Player 1 is the investor, the buyer, or the principal. Player 2 is the trustee, the seller, or the agent.
The multiplicative factor b determines how beneficial the game can be to the players. In some sense,
b is the value that the trustee provides to the investor-the value of agency, as it were. It can represent
the sum of the consumer surplus and the producer surplus attached to the purchase of a good (in the
case of a buyer-seller interaction) or the gains from active investment management (in the case of an
investor-investment manager interaction).
In a one-shot game, it is rational for the trustee to return nothing. Thus, it is rational for the
investor to give nothing. It is smart to be selfish. With the more general observation that agents are
self-interested actors as the starting point, much research has been devoted to the resolution of the
moral hazard problem inherent in agency. Before a transaction begins, investors can "screen" trustees
to select those who are trustworthy, and trustees can "signal" to investors that they are trustworthy
(Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973; Banks and Sobel, 1987; Cho and Kreps, 1987; Fudenberg and Tirole,
1992). Once the transaction is in progress, investors have other means-for example, the monitoring
of agents-to maintain trustworthy behavior (Holmstrom, 1979, 1982; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983;
Rogerson, 1985; Dye, 1986; Fudenberg et al., 1990). In this paper, we show how particular types
of information-about how the other party is going to behave-can lead to the evolution of both
trusting and trustworthy behavior.
Information, in the form of "reputation," has been shown to be a remarkably effective tool for
achieving desirable behavior in non-cooperative games. Concern for one's reputation-even in the
absence of a real reputation mechanism-can lead individuals to act equitably (Hoffman et al., 1994;
Haley and Fessler, 2005; Dana et al., 2006; Shariff and Norenzayan, 2007; Ellingson and Johannesson,
2008). In a non-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, the temptation to defect can be overcome if players
have reputations that are functions of their past behavior. Cooperation leads to a good reputation,
defection leads to a bad reputation, and players base their decision on whether or not to cooperate
with you on your reputation. This is the notion of "indirect reciprocity" (Kandori, 1992; Nowak
and Sigmund, 1998, 2005; Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2006).
In the ultimatum game, there are two players. The first player chooses how to divide a certain
sum of money. The second player can either accept the division, in which case the players receive the
amounts chosen by player 1, or can reject it, in which case both parties receive nothing. It is rational
to offer the smallest possible amount in the player 1 role and to accept that amount in the player 2 role.
These are also the strategies selected by evolutionary game dynamics. However, if individuals in the
player 2 role have reputations for demanding certain contributions from player 1-they achieve those
reputations by making the costly decision to reject low offers-then the player 1 strategies evolve to
offer more equitable divisions (Nowak et al., 2000).
In a public goods game, there are N players, each of whom can make a contribution to a communal
pot. The sum of those contributions is multiplied by a factor greater than one and less than N. The
pot is then divided equally among all the players, independent of the size of their contributions
(which could be zero). While it is best for all players to contribute large amounts, that strategy is not
a Nash equilibrium: every player has an incentive to be selfish and contribute nothing. In behavioral
experiments, players in a repeated public goods game begin by contributing a significant amount. But
as the game progresses, the contributions decrease. This evolution towards selfishness can be avoided
if the histories of the contributions of players are made public and if the players use this information to
alter their behavior towards others in pairwise interactions (Milinski et al., 2002; Rand et al., 2009).
Information makes free-riding costly.
Just as with the Prisoner's Dilemma, the ultimatum game, and the public goods game, the avail-
ability of information about how other players will act can lead to desirable outcomes in the trust
game. There have been a number of studies of the effects that information and reputation have in a
repeated, usually binary, trust game (Berg et al., 1995; Anderhub et al., 2002; McCabe et al., 2003;
Bohnet and Huck, 2004; Engle-Warnick and Slonim, 2004). Here our approach differs. We con-
sider a non-repeated trust game with an infinite strategy space. Investors receive information about
trustees, with some probability, before transactions begin. When this probability is sufficiently high,
individuals then learn to be trusting and trustworthy. And when investors are trusting, there is an
immediate positive effect: more of the potential value b is captured by the players. Information leads
to efficient transactions. Critically, the probability that an investor has information about a trustee
does not need to be very high for trusting and trustworthy behavior to be rational and favored by
evolutionary dynamics.
There is a crucial difference, however, between the trust game and the three games mentioned
above as far as the positive effects of information are concerned. In those games, one measure of
information is sufficient to achieve a complete solution. All inefficiencies and inequities are resolved
in the Prisoner's Dilemma, for example, if players have reputations derived from how they behaved in
their last interaction. In the trust game, on the other hand, information about trustees leads to com-
pletely trusting behavior on the part of investors but, somewhat counterintuitively, only marginally
trustworthy behavior on the part of trustees. Thus, information makes transactions efficient, but all
the surplus is captured by trustees. We will see that collective irrationality on the part of investors leads
to more equitable splits of the game's proceeds but that such collective behavior is not evolutionarily
stable.
1.2 Evolutionary dynamics
We begin with two populations of size N, one of investors and one of trustees. Each investor has
a strategy parameter p, which indicates how much she gives when interacting with a trustee. Each
trustee has a strategy parameter q, which indicates how much he returns to the investor. When an
investor with strategy p meets a trustee with strategy q, the payoff to the investor is 1 - p + bpq and
the payoff to the trustee is bp(1 - q). We call a trustee with strategy q "trustworthy" if q > 1/b.
Investors who interact with such a trustee do not incur a loss.
Initially each p and q is selected from the uniform distribution on [0,1]. A large number of games
between investors and trustees are played-each game is played by an individual randomly chosen
from the investor population and another randomly chosen from the trustee population-and total
payoffs are summed for each individual. Both populations then evolve as follows. Two individuals,
call them A and B, are selected uniformly at random from the same population. Let fA be the average
per-game payoff of A, ftB the average per-game payoff of B, and
1
P . (1. 1)1 + e-M(ftA -2B)
B is replaced by a copy of A with probability p(l - y) and by a random mutant with probability pp.
In this evolutionary dynamic, y E [0,1] is the mutation rate. The parameter P controls the intensity
of selection. This constitutes one "generation" of the "pairwise comparison process" (Traulsen et al.,
2007). After B has assumed a new strategy, the cycle repeats with another round of games. This goes
on for a number of generations.
We can observe the trajectory of the strategy parameters over many generations to see how the
populations evolve. Figure 1-1 shows the values of p, averaged over all investors, and of q, averaged
over all trustees, as a function of time (generations) when b = 4. Initially, both averages are close
to 1/2. But over time, trustees evolve to return less and less to investors. Once their q's decrease,
investors evolve to give less and less to trustees. Both p and q drift down towards 0. The averages
never quite reach 0 because new strategies with p > 0 and q > 0 are constantly being introduced by
mutation. The strategies of investors and trustees evolve towards the Nash equilibria.
Proposition 1.1. The only Nash equilibria of the trust game are the strategies p = 0, q <; 1 / b.
Average strategies
102
Generations
Figure 1-1: The evolution of strategies over time. The amount given by investors, p, and the fraction
returned by trustees, q, both evolve towards 0: the Nash equilibrium is for investors to give nothing
and for trustees to return (essentially) nothing. The population size N is 25, the mutation rate y is
0.005, the selection intensity # is 20, and the value of agency b is 4. Each generation consists of 500
random games.
Proof This is an immediate corollary of Theorem 1.2 below (take r = 0). El
When we speak of Nash equilibria, we are referring to the choices that players make before any
games are played. Once they have decided how they will play-a choice of p for investors and a
choice of q for trustees-they are bound to play with those strategies in every pairwise interaction
until the next generation. We see that rational individuals will choose to be neither trusting nor
trustworthy. Regardless of whether individuals are rational actors or automatons whose behavior is
shaped by evolution, the result is the same: a population of cautious buyers and untrustworthy sellers.
With no real transactions occurring, the benefits of agency (b) are left uncollected.
1.3 Information availability
Suppose now that investors can obtain, with some probability, information about trustees before
games are played. More precisely, when an investor I and a trustee T meet, I will be informed of
the fraction that T will return, q, with probability r. We call r the "information availability." It is a
measure of how well information spreads in the population of investors.
This formulation of information availability can be viewed as a simplification of how "reputation"
spreads in social networks. Alice (the investor) and Bob (the trustee) interact in one transaction,
and afterwards Alice tells a number of her friends how Bob behaved. Those friends will keep that
information for some time (so it can inform their own behavior towards Bob in the future) before
forgetting it. Saying that the information availability is r can then be interpreted to mean that the
constant interaction between investors and trustees and the discussion among investors, along with
the limitations of memory, lead to a situation in which investors have (approximately) a probability r
of knowing how any given trustee will behave before the transaction begins.
We initially assume that investors are perfectly rational. If an investor knows that a trustee is
trustworthy (q > 1/b), the investor gives p. If she knows that a trustee is untrustworthy (q < 1/b),
she gives 0. If she knows that a trustee is marginally trustworthy (q = 1/b), she gives 0 or p, each
with probability 1/2. Finally, if she has no information about a trustee, she again gives 0 or p with
probability 1/2. As a function of the trustee's q (when it is known), the amount given by the investor
is determined by a step function (the blue line in Figure 1-5).
This formulation of the decision rule can be justified by appealing to an alternative interpretation
of the game and the strategy parameters players have. Instead of investors giving some amount p
between 0 and 1 to trustees, we will say that investors have a binary choice: they either give nothing
or give p. When an investor has information about a trustee, the probability that she makes the
transfer (i.e., that she gives p) can depend on q. Presumably, the higher the trustee's q, the higher the
probability that the investor makes the transfer. When an investor does not have information about
a trustee, she flips a fair coin to decide whether to make the transfer: she gives 0 half the time and
gives p half the time.
In this new interpretation of the game, the step function decision rule described above is still
(obviously) perfectly rational. When a trustee is trustworthy (q > 1/b), the investor makes the
transfer with probability 1. When a trustee is untrustworthy (q < 1/b), the investor makes the
transfer with probability 0. And when a trustee is marginally trustworthy (q = / b), the investor flips
a coin to determine whether to make the transfer or not-the investor is indifferent to the choice
since both possibilities lead to a payoff of 1.
We will switch freely between these two interpretations of the game: the amount transferred by
the investor in the original interpretation is equivalent to the expected amount transferred in the
"binary" interpretation.
Figure 1-2 shows the amount given by investors, p, averaged over the entire population of investors
and over all generations, as a function of b and r. For some values of b and r, the average p is
approximately 0. For other values, the average p is approximately 0.9. The phase transitioi from
low average p to high average p occurs along the critical curve r = 1 / (2b - 1) (red line). When
r < 1/(2b - 1), only the untrusting strategy p = 0 can be a Nash equilibrium for the investor. When
r > 1/(2b - 1), on the other hand, p = 1 can also be a Nash equilibrium. The equation of the
critical curve is a consequence of Theorem 1.2.
A similar transition occurs for the average value of q. Figure 1-3(a) shows the values of p (blue)
and q (red), averaged over their respective populations and over all generations, as functions of r when
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Figure 1-2: The amount given by investors, p, averaged over the entire investor population, over
all generations of the simulation, and over all simulation runs. When r < 1/(2b - 1), investors give
virtually nothing (p = 0 is the only Nash equilibrium). When r > 1 / (2b - 1), investors give virtually
everything (p = 1 is also a Nash equilibrium). There is a phase transition along the critical curve
r = 1/(2b - 1). The population size N is 25, the mutation rate y is 0.005, and the selection intensity
f is 20. Results are averaged over 100 simulation runs, each run consisting of 100,000 generations
and each generation consisting of 500 random games.
b = 4. For small values of r, the average q is approximately 0. At r = 1/(2b - 1) (dashed line), there
is a phase transition and the average q increases to slightly more than 1/ b.
As the value of agency b increases, the information availability r needed to incite trusting and
trustworthy behavior decreases. Higher values of b lead to higher frequencies of trustworthy trustees
at any given information availability. At the same time, while more trustees become trustworthy as
b increases, their absolute level of trustworthiness (q) decreases. Increasing the transaction's potential
benefit and increasing the amount of money the trustee has to divide makes trustees more stingy-on
average they return smaller fractions of their stakes. The intuition behind this is that as b increases,
trustees have more money to divide, but the absolute amount they have to return to satisfy investors
remains constant (just slightly more than 1). Therefore they return ever smaller fractions of their
stakes.
From Figure 1-3(a), we see that the average q increases to slightly more than 1/b once r >
1/(2b - 1). This is a result of the fact that p = 1, q = 1/b + e is a Nash equilibrium when
r > 1 / (2b - 1). Here is a more intuitive explanation. Suppose the investor I, with strategy p, is
interacting with the trustee T, with strategy q. If q < 1/b, then I does not benefit by giving anything
to T, so the profitable act is to give nothing. On the other hand, if q > 1 / b, then I maximizes her
profit by giving her entire endowment to T since bq > 1 - p + bpq for 0 < p < 1. Thus, if I knows
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Figure 1-3: (a) The average amount given by investors, p, and the average fraction returned by
trustees, q, as a function of the information availability r when b = 4. When r is small, p and q are
both close to 0. When r = 1/(2b - 1) (dashed line), there is a phase transition and p increases to
just slightly less than 1 and q increases to 1/b + e. (b) Average payoffs of investors and trustees as
functions of r. When information is present, trustees capture almost all the surplus. The population
size N is 25, the mutation rate Y is 0.005, the selection intensity A is 20, and the value of agency b
is 4. Results are averaged over 100 simulation runs, each run consisting of 100,000 generations and
each generation consisting of 500 random games.
T's q, T will in general receive nothing from a rational I if q < 1/b and will receive the full amount
b if q > 1/b. Hence, when a rational I knows T's strategy, it is optimal for T to be trustworthy,
but just barely so. We find that the population of trustees evolves precisely towards this marginally
trustworthy behavior when information is sufficiently prevalent.
Figure 1-3(b) shows the average payoffs obtained by investors and trustees as functions of r when
b = 4. When r is small, most investors are cautious (giving little) and most trustees are untrustworthy
(returning little). Investors get a payoff close to 1 and trustees a payoff close to 0. As r increases, the
payoff of investors increases only marginally, always remaining close to 1. On the other hand, the
payoff of trustees increases significantly, starting at 0 and rising rapidly once r 1 / (2b - 1). When
investors have information about trustees, trustees benefit more than investors do. It helps you a little
to know if someone is trustworthy. It helps you a lot to be known as trustworthy. Put another way,
widespread seller reputation helps sellers more than it helps buyers.
1.4 Experimental behavior
In the last section, we began by positing that the (expected) amount investors transfer to trustees is a
step function of the trustee's q (when the investor is informed of the q before the interaction begins).
A natural question to ask is how far actual human behavior deviates from this idealized, perfectly
rational decision strategy. We now describe our attempts to answer this question experimentally.
We performed a series of online trust game experiments using Amazon Mechanical Turk. AMT
is an all-purpose online labor market which is becoming increasingly popular as a venue for experi-
mental economics. Indeed, many classical results from behavioral economics have been replicated on
AMT (Horton et al., 2010).
In our trust game experiment, participants were presented with a series of screens describing the
rules of the game and asking them how they would behave under various scenarios. Since real-time
interaction is not yet possible on AMT, we had to rely on this "strategy" method for determining
individual behavior (Selten, 1967). After all individuals indicated how they would play, we paired
players manually, calculated payoffs, and compensated the subjects.
Figures 1-4(a) and (b) show examples of the screens that subjects see when participating in the
experiment. In Figure 1-4(a), the investor is asked how much the trustees must return for he or she
to be willing to make the transfer. In Figure 1-4(b), the trustee is asked how much he or she would
return to the investor assuming that the investor made the transfer. In both cases, the subjects use the
horizontal slider to indicate their answers.
1.4.1 Investor decision rule with information
We begin by focusing on investor behavior in the presence of information about trustees. Investors
were given a binary choice: they could either keep their initial endowment (which we set at 20 cents)
or transfer the entire endowment to the trustee. In the binary interpretation of the game, then, we
were forcing all investors to set their p's to 1. We set the value of agency b to 4. We then sought
to determine the probability that a typical investor makes a transfer as a function of the trustee's q.
Investors were asked to indicate "the minimum amount that Player 2 must return to you in order
for you to transfer the 20 cents" (Figure 1-4(a)) . From these responses, we obtained a cumulative
distribution function (N = 150, the pink line in Figure 1-5).
The investor response CDF is approximately sigmoidal, so we fit a sigmoid of the form
q a (1.2)
qa + ta
to the data using a maximum likelihood estimation. This estimation yielded parameters of a = 3.8
and t = 0.35. The red line in Figure 1-5 is the corresponding curve.
The "typical" investor's decision rule, in the presence of information about the trustee, deviates
from the perfectly rational step function response in two ways. First, investors demand more than just
an e > 0 profit from trustees. This type of irrationality corresponds to a horizontal translation of the
step function so that the step occurs at some t > 1/b. For investors in the experiment, the transition
was at t = 0.35. Second, the sensitivity of investors to changes in the trustees' q's can be dulled. This
type of irrationality corresponds to a smoothing of the step function (which yields a sigmoid). The
steeper the sigmoid (1.2) is at q = t, the more "rational" investors are. This slope is controlled by the
parameter a, which was 3.8 for investors in our experiment.
In later sections, we will investigate how these two types of irrationality affect outcomes for
investors and trustees.
1.4.2 Investor decision rule without information
Having determined how investors behave when they have information about trustees, we sought to
replicate past studies that show investors exhibit a high degree of trust even in non-repeated trust
games without information. For instance, Kosfeld et al. (2005) found that in a discrete trust game,
investors on average transferred 65% of their initial endowments (b = 3, N = 24).
In our experiment, investors (distinct from the ones described in Section 1.4.1) were asked
whether or not they would make the 20 cent transfer even without any information about trustees.
A large fraction (81%) indicated that they would (b = 4, N = 181).
We can summarize what our theory has to say about how a typical investor behaves when meeting
a trustee of unknown q as follows. Each investor has a strategy parameter p indicating how much he
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Figure 1-4: Examples of screens presented to participants in the Amazon Mechanical Turk trust game
experiment (a) Investors are asked to indicate how much they want from trustees. (b) Trustees are
asked to indicate how much they will return to the investor if the investor makes a nonzero transfer.
or she will transfer to a trustee if the decision to transfer is made. In a world without information,
evolution favors p's close to zero (Figure 1-1). When information about trustees is somewhat available,
evolution favors p's close to 1 (Figure 1-2): as long as the information availability exceeds a certain
threshold (0(1/b)), then investors evolve to have high p's. In any given interaction, however, an
investor might have to deal with a trustee whose q is unknown. In such cases, investors randomize
between giving 0 and giving p. Given that the typical p is between 0.9 and 1, our theory therefore
predicts that investors will transfer 45% to 50% of their initial endowments.
1.5 Investor irrationality: Minimum required rate of return
Suppose now that investors have a minimum required rate of return on their investment. This cor-
responds to the first type of irrationality discussed above. We capture this required rate of return in
a second strategy parameter for the investor, which we call the return threshold and denote by t.
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Figure 1-5: Various functions giving the (expected) amount transferred by an investor to a trustee
whose q is known. Perfectly rational investors make the transfer with probability 1 when q > 1 / b
and with probability 0 when q < 1/b (blue line). In the AMT trust game experiment, the transfer
probability as a function of q is approximately sigmoidal (pink line). A maximum likelihood estimation
fits the experimental response to a sigmoid of the form qa/ (qa + ta), where t = 0.35 and a = 3.8 (red
line).
The return threshold influences investor behavior in the following way. When an investor knows
a trustee's q, she gives p only if q > t. If q < t, she gives 0. If q = t, she gives 0 or p each with
probability 1/2 and thus p/2 on average. For the perfectly rational decision rule, t = 1/b.
If the investor does not know the trustee's q, she imputes a value of t. This effectively results in
the investor giving 0 or p each with probability 1/2, which is the natural decision strategy in the
"binary" interpretation of the game we introduced earlier. We can also justify the imputation rule in
another way. If the investor knows a trustee's q and that q is greater than t, then she would prefer to
interact with that trustee over one whose q is unknown. Similarly, if the investor knows a trustee's
q and that q is less than t, then she would prefer to interact with a trustee of unknown q. Hence, a
trustee of unknown q is, as far as the investor's decision process goes, similar to a trustee whose q is
known to be t.
If a trustee returns a fraction q of what he receives, then the rate of return for the investor is
(bpq - p)/p, or bq - 1. Thus, the condition q > 1/b is equivalent to the investor's earning a positive
return. A return threshold of t thus means that the investor demands a rate of return of at least
bt - 1 on her interactions with the trustee. Trustees have no information about the rates of return
demanded by investors.
'Other imputation rules give essentially the same results: one such rule would have investors impute the population
average q for trustees of unknown q
When no information is available (the investor does not know the trustee's q), the payoff to I
when meeting T is
7T, =j 1 p + bq(1.3)2 2
since the investor gives p/2 on average when she imputes a q of t. When information is available
(the investor knows the trustee's q), the payoff to I when meeting T is
1 ifq < t
__I,2 1-L+ ifq=t (1.4)
1-p+bpq ifq>t.
Finally, when the information availability is r, the payoff to I when meeting T is
7I = (1 - r) 71,1 + rnI,2
1 - P(1 - bq)(1 - r) if q < t (1.5)
1 - (1 - bq) if q =t
1(1 - bq)(1I+ r) if q > t.
We now repeat the calculation for the trustees. When information is not available, the payoff to T
when meeting I is
bp(1 - q)
T,1 - 2 (1.6)
When information is available, the payoff to T when meeting I is
0 if q < t
7T,2 = (1-q) ifq=t (1.7)
bp(1 - q) if q > t.
Hence, when the information availability is r, the payoff to T when meeting I is
T= (1 -- rT,1 + r2TT,2
b(1 - q)(1 - r) if q < tf (1.8)
(1 - q) ifq=t
S(1 - q)(1 + r) if q > t.
Given these payoff functions, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 1.2. In the trust game with information, the strategies p = 0, q = a, where a < 1/b, are Nash
equilibria for all r. The strategies p = 1, q = t + e, e -+ 0, are Nash equilibria for r > t / (2 - t). The
strategies p = 0, 1 /b < q < t are Nash equilibria ifr = 1. These are the only Nash equilibria of the game.
Proof Suppose p = 0 and q < 1/b, so r= 1 and rT = 0. By switching to p' > 0. I changes her
payoff to
7= -( - bq)(1 - u) < 1=_,
IL~ 2
where u = 0 or u = r. The last inequality holds because 1 - bq > 0 (since q 1/b) and 1 - u > 0
(since u < r < 1). I thus has no incentive to switch from p = 0 to p' > 0. Since the payoff to T is
0 whatever his q is, he also has no incentive to switch strategies. Hence, p 0, q < 1/b are Nash
equilibria.
Suppose p = 0 and q > 1/b, so TI 1 and 7TT = 0. By switching to p' 1, I changes her payoff
to
=1- (I - bq)(1 - u) >1= 7r,2
where u is 0, r, or -r. The last inequality is strict as long as u / 1. Now u = 1 if and only if q < t
(so u = r) and r = 1. Thus, p = 0, q > 1/b are not Nash equilibria if r = 1 and q < t. When these
latter two conditions hold, the investor cannot improve her payoff by switching her p to something
other than zero, and the trustee cannot improve his payoff since it is zero for any value of q he chooses
(because p is zero). We conclude that p = 0, q > 1/b are Nash equilibria if and only if q < t and
r = 1.
Suppose 0 < p < 1 and q < 1/b, so 7r = 1 - (p/2)(1 - bq)(1 - r) and nrT = (bp/2)(1 - q)(1 -
r). By switching to p' = 0, 1 changes her payoff to
nTj = > 1 -- {p(1 - bq) (1 - r) = r.
The inequality is strict as long as r / 1. If r = 1, then T improves his payoff by switching to q = t.
We conclude that 0 < p < 1, q < 1/b are never Nash equilibria.
Suppose 0 < p < 1 and q = 1/b, so nrr = 1 and nrT = (bp/2)(1 - 1/b)(1 - u), where u is 0 or
r. I cannot change her payoff from 1 by switching strategies. If q 1/b < t, then T improves his
payoff by switching to q = 0 if r : 1 and to q = t if r = 1. If q = 1/b = t, then T improves his
payoff by switching to q = t + e ifr 7 0 and to q = 0 ifr = 0. Hence, 0 < p < 1, q = 1/b are never
Nash equilibria.
Suppose 0 < p < 1 and q > 1/b, so 7r = 1 - (p /2)(1 - bq)(1 - u) and rT = (bp /2)(1 - q)(1 -
u), where u is 0, r, or -r. I improves her payoff by switching to p' = 1 unless q < t and r = 1. If
q < t and r = 1, then T improves his payoff (which was originally 0) by switching to q = t. Thus,
0 < p < 1 and q > 1/b are never Nash equilibria.
Suppose p = 1 and q < t, so r, = 1 - (1/2)(1 - bq)(1 - r) and 7 rT = (b/2)(1 - q)(1 - r).
Then T improves his payoff by switching to q = 0 if r : 1 and to q = t (if r = 1). Therefore p = 1,
q < t are never Nash equilibria.
Suppose p = 1 and q = t, so 7r 1 - - bt) and nr = (b/2)(1 - t). Then T improves his
payoff by switching to q = t+e ifr # 0 and to q = 0 ifr = 0, so p 1, q = t is never a Nash
equilibrium.
Suppose p = 1 and q > t (this does not include the limiting case q = t + e, c -a 0), so r,
1 - (1/2)(1 - bq)(1 + r) and rT = (b/2)(1 - q)(1 + r). Then T improves his payoff by switching
to q = t + c, so p = 1, q > t are never Nash equilibria.
Finally, suppose p = 1 and q = t + e, so
1
ri = 1 - (1 - b(t + e))(1 + r) (1.9)2
and
b
nr = (1 - (t+ e))(1 + r). (1.10)
If I switches from p = 1 to p' < 1, her new payoff is
( b(t + ))(1+ r),(1.11)
which is less than her old payoff since b(t + e) > 1. Thus she has no incentive to switch strategies.
T's payoff will obviously decrease if he increases the amount he returns to I. Suppose then that
he decreases the amount he returns from q = t + e to q' = t. His original payoff will be no smaller
than his new payoff as long as
b(1 - t) < b(1 - (t + c)) (1+ r), (1.12)b 
which is equivalent to
r > . (1.13)
--1 - t - e,
Since e - 0, T has no incentive to switch from q = t + e to q = t, regardless of the value of r.
Now suppose T decreases the amount he returns to q' < t. His original payoff will be no less
than his new payoff as long as
b, b
2 q') r) < -(1 - (t + ))(1+ r). (1.14)2 2
Taking the limit e -- 0, we find that this condition is equivalent to
t -q'
r > . (1.15)
-2 - t - q'
We claim that if r > t/ (2 - t), then (1.15) will be satisfied for all q' in the interval [0, t]. Indeed,
differentiating the right side of (1.15) with respect to q' yields
2t - 2 (116
(2 - t - q')2
Since t E [1/b,1), (1.16) has no zeros and thus the quantity on the right in (1.15) has its extrema at
q' = 0 and q' = t. When q' = 0, the quantity is t /(2 - t). When q' = t, the quantity is 0. The right
side of (1.15) is hence at most t/(2 - t), so r > t/(2 - t) guarantees that the inequality (1.15) holds
for all q' C [0, t]. Thus, the trustee has no incentive to switch from q = t + e to q' < t, so p = 1,
q = t + c is indeed a Nash equilibrium when r > t /(2 - t). E
Let us assume first that all the investors have the same required threshold t. Figure 1-6(a) shows
the population average p and q as functions of the information availability r when b = 4 and t = 2/5
for all investors. At r = t/ (2 - t) (dashed magenta line), there is a transition and the average p goes
to 1 and the average q to slightly more than 2/5. This is what we expect as p = 1, q = t + c is a Nash
equilibrium once r > t/(2 - t). Figure 1-6(b) shows the average payoffs to investors and trustees.
Now once r > t/(2 - t), the payoff to the investor increases significantly more than it does when
t = 1/b = 1/4. Thus, if investors collectively demand a return fraction t from trustees, then they
can-through a form of cooperation-achieve a high payoff. But this extra return to the investors
does not come for "free": they must have somewhat more information about trustees-r > tU (2 - t)
(magenta line) instead ofjust r > 1 / (2b - 1) (yellow line)-to extract these additional gains. In fact,
given that the critical curve is
t
r(t) = (1.17)
2- t
and that
- 2(1-t) > 0 (1.18)
dt (2-t)2
the amount of information required, r(t), for investors to achieve an average return fraction of t + c
from trustees is a monotonically increasing function of t. The more investors demand (collectively)
from trustees, the more information they must have before trustees evolve to return the desired
amount.
Now suppose that each investor has her own return threshold t and that t is itself subject to
evolutionary pressure. Figure 1-7(a) shows how the average investor's decision strategy converges to
the perfectly rational strategy over time: the step function moves closer and closer to the rational one
0. .
(b)
Average strategies
- Amount given by investor, p
- Fraction returned by trustee, q
0.2 0.4 0.6
Information availability, r
0.8 1.0
Information availability, r
Figure 1-6: (a) The average amount given by investors, p, and the average fraction returned by
trustees, q, as a function of the information availability r when b = 4 but investors collectively
demand t = 0.4 > 1/b. Once r > t/(2 - t), the average q is t + e, so investors are able to "force"
trustees to return the desired fraction. (b) As a result, the payoff to investors increases significantly as
a function of r. This extra payoff does not come for free, however: investors must cooperate and all
demand the same return fraction t, and they need substantially more information (dashed magenta
line) than they did before (dashed yellow line) before trustees evolve to return t. The population size
N is 25, the mutation rate y is 0.005, the selection intensity P is 20, and the value of agency b is 4.
Results are averaged over 100 simulation runs, each run consisting of 100,000 generations and each
generation consisting of 500 random games.
with the transition at t = 1/b. Figure 1-7(b) shows the time- and population-average values of p,
q, and t when r = 1. First, while it is best for all investors to coordinate and select high t's, the t's
evolve towards 1 / b: when every investor demands t > 1/b, an investor who deviates unilaterally and
demands t - e does better as she engages in more transactions with trustees. Eventually all investors
learn to demand just slightly more than 1/b, and we thus inexorably evolve back to the state in
which trustees capture almost all the profits. Second, once investors all demand just slightly more
than 1/b, trustees evolve to return just slightly more than 1/b and again capture all the benefits of
agency. Investor irrationality, in the form of a high, population-wide return threshold t, is hence a
public good.
1.6 Investor irrationality: Sensitivity to information
We began by positing that investors behave in a binary manner when they have information about the
trustee with whom they are interacting. If the investor's return threshold is t, she gives p if q > t and
0 of q < t. In the presence of information, the investor's "response" to the trustee's q is a step function
with the jump at q = 1/b. In the previous section, we saw that evolution selects the transition point
to be at approximately 1/b.
Now we relax this assumption of perfect rationality on the part of the investor. We will allow
for the possibility that an investor chooses to make an investment that is smaller than optimal (in
expectation) when trustees are trustworthy and for the possibility that an investor makes an investment
that is too large (again, in expectation) when trustees are untrustworthy. This corresponds to the
second type of "irrationality" observed in the online trust game experiment.
Suppose the investor I knows the trustee T's q. Then I gives p with probability
q , (1.19)
qa + ta
where a is the investor's "rationality level." If I does not know T's q, then she imputes a q of t: this
means that she gives p with probability 1/2 and 0 with probability 1/2. The expected amount given
by an investor I(p, t, a) to a trustee T(q) is hence
rp qata + (1 - r). (1.20)q + t2
When q is small, the investor gives essentially nothing on average. When q is large, the investor gives
essentially p. There is a transition in the expected amount given at q = t. The rationality level a
controls how steep this transition is. The larger a is, the steeper the transition. The constant response
of an individual who ignores the available information is obtained by taking a = 0. Such an individual
essentially flips a (fair) coin to determine how much to give the trustee. The "binary" response of the
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Figure 1-7: Investors evolve so that t is just slightly more than 1/b: collectively irrational behavior
maintaining a population-wide t larger than 1/b is thus not evolutionarily stable. (a) An example,
from one simulation run, of how the average investor's decision strategy converges to the perfectly
rational strategy over time: the step function moves closer and closer to the rational one with the
transition at t = 1/b. (b) The time- and population-average values of the strategy parameters p (the
amount given by the investor), t (the return fraction demanded by the investor), and q (the fraction
returned by the trustee) when the information availability r is 1. Once t evolves to 1/b, q evolves to
1/b as well, and trustees once again capture all the game's proceeds. The population size N is 25, the
mutation rate y is 0.005, the selection intensity # is 20, and the value of agency b is 4. Results are
averaged over 100 simulation runs, each run consisting of 200,000 generations and each generation
consisting of 500 random games.
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(b)
perfectly rational individual discussed in the previous section is obtained by taking the limit a -± co.
Figure 1-8(a) shows investors' average p as a function of r and a when b = 4 and all investors have
the same (fixed) rationality level a. When r is small, the value of a is irrelevant: with no information
to process, an individual's rationality level is immaterial and investors give essentially nothing. When
r is large, all values of the rationality level lead to completely trusting behavior. Figure 1-8(b) shows
the analogous plot for trustees' average q. There are two interesting phenomena. First, the average
q is slightly higher than it is in the case in which investors are perfectly rational (~ 0.35 now instead
of ~ 0.25). Second, for sufficiently large r, the value of q is a non-monotonic function of a. Both of
these phenomena can be explained by the same argument.
In the limit of perfect rationality, there is no incentive for trustees to be more than just marginally
trustworthy. Whatever a trustee's q is, as long as it is greater than t, a rational investor will choose to
give the full amount. When a is finite, on the other hand, an increase in q always leads to an increase
in (expected) p. Thus, a trustee is incentivized to increase his q as long as the increase in the absolute
amount received from the investor outweighs the loss due to the increase in the fraction he returns.
We can make this precise as follows. Suppose the investor I gives p and the trustee T returns q.
The payoff to the trustee is bp(1 - q). Now let q increase to q + Aq and p increase to p + Ap. Then
the new payoff to the trustee is
b(p + Ap)(1 - q - Aq). (1.21)
After some arithmetic, we find that the new payoff will be larger than the old payoff when
Ap > . (1.22)1+q+Aq
Dividing both sides by Aq then letting Aq -+ 0, we obtain
dp p (1.23)
dq 1+ q
When the inequality (1.23) holds, trustees should increase the proportion q that they return.
We take p to be the function of q given by (1.20) in the limit of perfect information:
qa
p (q) = q . (1.24)qa + ta
Here p is essentially the probability that the investor makes the transfer as a function of the trustee's
(known) q.
Now we derive the condition on q that will incentivize a rational trustee to increase his q when
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Figure 1-8: (a) Average amount given by investors, p, when all investors have the same fixed rational-
ity level a. When r is small, the rationality level does not affect p since investors have no information
to process. When r is large, p is essentially 1 regardless of a. (b) Average fraction returned by trustees,
q, again when all investors have the same fixed rationality level a. For small values of a, the average
q is higher than it is when investors are perfectly rational, and q is a non-monotonic function of a.
The population size N is 25, the mutation rate y is 0.005, the selection intensity P is 20, and the
value of agency b is 4. Results are averaged over 100 simulation runs, each run consisting of 100,000
generations and each generation consisting of 500 random games.
information is widespread. As we saw in the main text, we can write the condition in general as
d p p , (1.25)
dq 1+q'
where p is a function of q giving the probability that the investor makes the transfer to the trustee
when she learns the trustee's q.
Let us begin by assuming that the sigmoid p(q) has a slightly different functional form. We set
1p(q) = 1 e(1.26)
This function is steepest at q = t, where the slope is h/4. Then
dp he-h(q-t) (1.27)
dq (1+e-h(q-t))2
The condition dp/dq > p /( 1I+ q) becomes
he-h~q-t-h(q-t)he-h(-t) (1 +I-q) > 1 +  e ) (1.28)
which we can rearrange to yield
(h + hq - 1 )e-h(q-t) > 1. (1.29)
Taking logarithms, we obtain
log(hq + h - 1) - h(q - t) > 0. (1.30)
Now we make the approximation hq + h - 1 m hq + h = h(q + 1) to get
log h + log(1I+ q) - hq + ht > 0. (1.31)
Since log(1 + x) ~ x for small x, we have
logh + q - hq + ht > 0, (1.32)
or
log h + ht (1.33)
h-e
Now the probability that the investor transfers her endowment to a trustee who is known to
return a fraction q of what he receives is given by
qI
p(q) =qa + ta
1
1 + (t/q)a
1 (1.34)
1 + ealog(t/q)
1
1 + ea(log t-logq)
1
1+ e-a(logq-logt)'
Thus, the decision rule we have selected for the investor is equivalent to the sigmoid decision rule
(1.26) after the scale for q (and t) has been changed. Substituting into (1.33) and replacing h with a,
we obtain
log a + a log tlogq < a-i (1.35)
a - 1
or
q < exp (lo.a±+logt (1.36)
a - 1
Thus, as long as q satisfies (1.36), rational trustees will have an incentive to increase their q's. In the
limit of perfect rationality, a - oo, (1.36) reduces to q < t. We thus obtain in another way our earlier
result that q evolves to approximately t. Note that the foregoing analysis only applies when investors
have perfect knowledge of trustees' q's.
For all but the smallest values of a, we have
log a + a log t
ai > log t. (1.37)a - 1
We see that finite rationality levels lead to an average q larger than t. This effect is dampened by the
fact that the information availability is generally less than one, but it provides an explanation for why
there is a general increase in q for all a < oo and sufficiently large r.
The estimate for q given by (1.36) can explain the non-monotonicity of the average q, as a function
of a, when r ~ 1: (1.36) is a one-humped function of a. Figure 1-9 compares the estimate given
by (1.36) and the actual average value of q for the b = 2, r = 1 case. The intuition behind the
two phenomena in Figure 1-8(b) is thus the following: trustees increase the fraction they return as
long as the increase in "volume" (in the form of higher contributions from investors) outweighs the
loss resulting from smaller "margins." Unsurprisingly, moderate values of a are also best for average
investor payoffs. These payoffs are maximized at the same values of a that maximize the average
trustee q (Figure 1-10). We note that-perhaps coincidentally-the irrationality level observed in
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Figure 1-9: The average fraction returned by trustees, q, and the analytic estimate for that amount,
provided by (1.36), as a function of the uniform investor irrationality level a. The population size
N is 25, the mutation rate y is 0.005, the selection intensity P is 20, and the value of agency b is 2.
Results are averaged over 100 simulation runs, each run consisting of 100,000 generations and each
generation consisting of 500 random games.
the online trust game experiment was 3.8, close to the value of a that maximizes q and the average
investor payoff as predicted by the theory (Figures 1-8(b) and 1-10).
Suppose that the information availability is high (r = 1) and that the rationality level of the
population is approximately 6. Then from Figure 1-9, we see that the average q is approximately 0.6,
which is its maximum value. If any given investor could increase her rationality level, however, then
her payoff would increase relative to the rest of the population. It is best for investors if a is uniformly
small, but then every investor has the incentive to deviate unilaterally and increase her a. Evolution
favors such "defection": Figure 1-11 shows how the average investor's sigmoidal response gets steeper
with time, eventually converging on the perfectly rational step function.
As with Section 1.5, this result is reminiscent of a public goods game in which the contribution
each player makes to the communal pot varies inversely with a. A small a corresponds to a large
contribution and a large a corresponds to a small contribution. It is optimal for everyone to make
a large contribution. But any single individual has an incentive to be a free-rider, and eventually
cooperation breaks down.
1.7 Conclusion
We have shown that introducing information (or "reputation") into the trust game can lead to trusting
behavior on the part of investors and marginally trustworthy behavior on the part of trustees. With just
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Figure 1-10: The average investor payoff as a function of the uniform investor irrationality level a. As
with the average fraction returned by trustees, q, the average payoff is a nonmonotonic function of a
when r is sufficiently high. The population size N is 25, the mutation rate Y is 0.005, the selection
intensity p is 20, and the value of agency b is 4. Results are averaged over 100 simulation runs, each
run consisting of 100,000 generations and each generation consisting of 500 random games.
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Figure 1-11: An example, from one simulation run, of how investors evolve so that their sensitivity
to information about trustees increases. As time passes, the average investor's decision strategy gets
steeper and steeper at q = 1/b, converging on the perfectly rational step function. The population
size N is 25, the mutation rate p is 0.05, the selection intensity # is 20, and the value of agency b is 4.
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one reputation mechanism in place, trustees capture most of the game's proceeds: reputation helps
sellers more than it helps buyers. If investors can maintain a degree of collective irrationality-by
demanding more than is rational from trustees or by having their sensitivity to information about
trustees be somewhat dulled-then they can achieve a more equitable split with trustees. But such
collective irrationality is not evolutionarily stable: any single investor has an incentive to deviate
unilaterally and act more rationally. Thus, irrationality is a public good in the trust game.
Acknowledgements
We thank Max Bazerman, Deepak Malhotra, and Daniel Rosenbloom for comments. Support from
the the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (Grand Challenges grant 37874), the Harvard University
Mind, Brain, and Behavior Program, the NSF/NIH joint program in mathematical biology (NIH
grant R01GM078986), theJohn Templeton Foundation, andj. Epstein is gratefully acknowledged.
Chapter 2
Robust mechanisms for the evolution of trust
Michael L. Manapat, David G. Rand, and Martin A. Nowak
Abstract Trust is essential in virtually all economic interactions. Buyers must trust sellers, employers
must trust employees, and so on for economies to function smoothly and efficiently. In this paper, we
build on our previous work analyzing the evolution of trust from the perspective of game theory. In
the trust game, two players, an "investor" and a "trustee," have the chance to win a sum of money.
The investor begins with one monetary unit and can choose to transfer a fraction of it to the trustee.
Whatever she transfers is multiplied by a factor b > 1. The trustee can then return a fraction of his
choosing to the investor. Previously, we showed that adding information, or "reputation," to this game
can lead to efficient outcomes: the two players together capture all the potential benefit b. However,
trustees paradoxically walk away with most of the profits-this even though it is investors who should
be earning significant returns by deploying their "capital." Here we describe two evolutionarily robust
mechanisms for achieving efficient outcomes that favor the investor while still compensating trustees
for the value of their agency. In the first mechanism, "comparison shopping," investors compare
limited information about various trustees before committing to a transaction. Comparing just two
trustees at the beginning of each interaction is enough to achieve a split desirable to the investor, even
when information about trustees is only partially available. In the other mechanism, a second layer
of information is added so that trustees sometimes know what rates of return investors desire. The
trust game then becomes similar to an ultimatum game, and positive investor outcomes can be reached
once this second type of information is sufficiently pervasive.
2.1 Introduction
In our previous work, we introduced the following variant of the trust game. Each investor has a
strategy parameter p, p E [0, 1], dictating how much she transfers to the trustee when she makes the
decision to transfer. The trustee receives b > 1 times whatever the investor transfers. Each trustee
has a strategy parameter q, q E [0, 1], dictating the fraction he returns to the investor after receiving
a nonzero transfer. Thus, the payoff to the investor is (1 - p) + bpq and the payoff to the trustee is
bp(1 - q).
With probability r, an investor is informed of a trustee's q before having to commit to the trans-
action. We call r the "information availability." It is a measure of how well information (or "repu-
tation") circulates in the population of investors. When the investor is aware of the trustee's q, the
probability that she makes the transfer can depend on q. When the investor is unaware of the trustee's
q, she makes the transfer (gives p) half the time and declines to make the transfer (gives 0) the other
half of the time. Hence, an investor with strategy parameter p gives p/2 in expectation to trustees
of unknown q. When information is sufficiently widespread, the investor and the trustee together
capture most of the game's potential benefit (b), but trustees get the vast majority of the profits.
Through an online trust game experiment, we found that the probability P(q) that a typical
investor makes the transfer to a trustee who returns q is an approximately sigmoidal function of q:
P(q)= . (2.1)
qa + ta
The perfectly rational investor acts according to (2.1) with a - oo and t = 1/b. However, such
behavior is not optimal. If all investors can maintain a population-wide level of irrationality (a < oo
or t > 1/b), then trustees evolve to return higher fractions of what they receive. Collective irrational-
ity on the part of investors leads to a more equitable split of the game's proceeds. However, such
coordination is not evolutionarily stable: any single investor has an incentive to deviate unilaterally
and act more rationally. In a manner of speaking, irrationality is a public good in the trust game.
In this paper, we examine "mechanisms" that can lead to divisions of the game's proceeds that
favor the investor. The investor is, after all, the party employing an "agent" (the trustee) to some
end, so ultimately the investor should capture a significant portion of the transaction's benefits. When
these mechanisms are in place, the populations of investors and trustees should evolve so that all the
proceeds of the game are captured by the players (the system should be "efficient") and so that the
proceeds are split in a fair way (the system should be "equitable"). We will encounter two devices
for achieving efficiency and equity: "comparison shopping," in which investors actively compare
multiple trustees before committing to a transaction, and a second layer of information that builds on
the fact that the trust game has an embedded ultimatum game when the "information availability" is
high.
2.2 Comparison shopping
2.2.1 The economics of comparison shopping
Suppose that when an investor wants to enter a transaction, she selects k trustees uniformly at random
from the population of all possible trustees. The trustees return fractions q1, q2,. -.. , qk of what they
receive. The investor knows trustee i's return fraction qi with probability r, independent of what she
knows about the q's of other trustees. If she doesn't know a particular trustee's q, she imputes the
value of 1 / b. An investor would prefer a trustee who is known to return q > 1/b to a trustee about
whom she has no information, and she would prefer a trustee about whom she has no information
to a trustee who is known to return q < 1/b. Thus, a trustee of unknown q is effectively the same
as one whose q is known to be 1/b, at least as far as the investor's decision process is concerned.
This decision strategy is a natural extension of the "sigmoidal" rule we analyzed in our previous
work. We can summarize it as follows. Let
, qi, with probability r,
qi = (2.2)
1/b, with probability 1 - r.
Then an investor of "rationality level" a decides to engage in the transaction with trustee i with
probability
'la
(2.3)q~aa + - -- + kbj
She decides not to engage in any transaction at all with probability
,~a+q ...± a +±(k/b)a (2.4)q~a + q +-- -+ + kbj
The investor's rationality level determines how sensitive she is to differences between the trustees.
When a = 0, the investor makes her selection uniformly at random. In the limit a - o, the investor
will always select the trustee offerring the highest q' (unless all the q's are less than 1/b, in which case
the investor takes no action at all).
Figure 2-1 shows the payoff to perfectly rational (a -+ oo) investors and trustees as a function
of the information availability r when b = 4 and k = 2. The payoff to investors increases steadily
and significantly with r: the more information investors have, the more they are able to discriminate
among trustees. The payoff to trustees, on the other hand, initially increases with r, peaks, and then
begins to decrease. When r is 0, investors are not trusting and thus the payoff to trustees is essentially
zero. When r is 1, investors are perfectly discriminating-they always choose to interact with the
trustee offering the highest q-and so trustees evolve to have q's of 1 - e. The payoff to trustees is thus
just above zero. For intermediate values of r, trustees must return more than just 1/b (as they are
competing against each other) but can "get away" with q's somewhat less than 1 since investors do
not always have information about trustees. Trustees' payoffs are thus maximized for an r such that
0 < r < 1.
We can obtain an analytical understanding of comparison shopping, for the k = 2 case, with the
following simple toy model. Suppose there are just two trustees and that they initially both have the
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Figure 2-1: Average payoffs of investors and trustees as functions of r when investors "comparison
shop." Here investors compare two trustees (k = 2) before committing to the transaction. The
average payoff to investors increases linearly as a function of r-the higher r is, the better investors
are able to discriminate. The payoff to trustees is maximized for intermediate values of r-too little
information and investors abstain from transactions, too much information and trustees must "race
to the bottom." The population size N is 25, the mutation rate y is 0.005, the selection intensity # is
20, and the value of agency b is 4. Results are averaged over 100 simulation runs, each run consisting
of 100,000 generations and each generation consisting of 500 random games.
same q. Let P denote the probability that the first trustee is selected by the investor, and as always let
r denote the (fixed) information availability. Then
P r 2 q +r(1-r) t +r(1-r) q +(1-r)22(q + t) q + 3t q + 3t 4 (2.5)
r2q r(1 - r)(q + t) (1 - r)2
2(q+t) q+3t 4
where t = 1/b. A direct calculation shows that
dP _ r2t 2r(1-r)t (2.6)
dq 2(q-+t) 2  (q-+3t)2
Suppose the amount given by the investor, when she chooses to interact with one of the two
trustees, is 1. Then the expected payoff to the first trustee, which we denote by T, is
n =P(1 - q). (2.7)
Thus,
dr dP
[ r2t 2r(1 - r)t r2q r( - r)(q + t) (1 - r)2-
= _ + -r +t2(1 - q) - + +.[2(q-+t) 2  (q+3t)2 _ 2(q+t) q+3t 4
For a fixed r, trustees will keep increasing their q's until their marginal payoff is zero, i.e., until
dn/dq = 0. Put another way, a trustee faces a trade-off when deciding whether to change his q:
when q is large, the trustee has a higher probability of being chosen by the investor, but he also must
return a larger fraction to the investor if he is, in fact, chosen. A trustee will choose a q that optimizes
his payoff given this trade-off.
To get some idea of how our toy model predicts trustees will behave, we can, for each value of
r, solve the equation dnr/dq = 0 numerically to find the fraction returned by the trustee, q(r). The
payoff to the trustee as a function of r is then approximately P(q(r))(1 - q(r)) (Figure 2-2). As in
Figure 2-1, this is a one-humped function of r with the peak at r ~ 0.6.
2.2.2 "Irrationality" and the inability to discriminate
We have just seen that comparison shopping leads to a situation in which, for most values of r, the
investor reaps most of the benefit from the transaction while the trustee is still compensated for the
value he adds as an agent. These results hold in the limit of perfect rationality. What happens when
investors are of bounded rationality (a < oo)?
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Figure 2-2: A toy model estimate for the average trustee payoff as a function of the information
availability r. A higher q leads to a higher probability of being chosen by an investor, but it also
means a higher fraction of what one receives must be returned to the investor. A trustee will keep
increasing his q until the gain in profit from the first effect is balanced by the loss in profit due to the
second, i.e., until his marginal return is zero. Given that optimal value q(r), the payoff to the trustee
is P(q(r))(1 - q(r)), where P(q) is the probability that the investor makes the transfer to a trustee
who is known to return a fraction q.
Figure 2-3(a) shows the average return fraction q of trustees as a function of the (population-wide)
investor rationality level for three different values of the information availability r (0.1, 0.5, and 1.0)
when b = 4 and k = 2. When r is reasonably large, trustees always return more when investors are
rational: higher rationality levels lead to a greater ability to discriminate between trustees. Only when
r is 0.1 is bounded rationality better for the investor, and even in that case the advantage is minimal.
Figure 2-3(b) shows the analogous plot for the average investor payoff: the more rational investors
are, the greater their payoffs. Thus, the benefits of comparison shopping that accrue to investors are
stable under evolutionary pressure.
2.3 The embedded ultimatum game
In this section, we return to the trust game without comparison shopping (k = 1). We describe
how the trust game has, embedded within it, another game (the "ultimatum game") and how adding
information to this subgame can lead to positive outcomes for investors in the trust game.
There are two players in the ultimatum game. Player 1 (the "proposer") begins by proposing a
division of one monetary unit. Player 2 (the "responder") can accept this division, in which case the
players are paid according to Player l's suggestion, or Player 2 can reject it, in which case both players
receive nothing. The rational strategy for the proposer is to offer the responder as little as possible,
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Figure 2-3: (a) Average fraction returned by trustees, q, when all investors have the same fixed
rationality level a and when the comparison set size k is 2 (investors compare two trustees before
committing to a transaction). The average q increases with a for all but the smallest values of r. (b)
The analogous plot for average investor payoff. It is always better for investors to be more rational
(even when r is small). The population size N is 25, the mutation rate y is 0.005, the selection
intensity p is 20, and the value of agency b is 4. Results are averaged over 100 simulation runs, each
run consisting of 100,000 generations and each generation consisting of 500 random games.
and the rational strategy for the responder is to accept this minimal offer. In reality, however, humans
do not play rationally: they tend to give substantial amounts as proposers and to reject low offers as
responders.
Now suppose that the information availability in the trust game is 1, so investors always know
the fraction q that trustees will return. When this is the case, the trust game becomes similar to an
ultimatum game. The trustee, in the form of his q, is proposing a division of the game's proceeds (b).
The investor can accept that division, by transferring her endowment of funds, or she can reject it,
by transferring nothing. Thus, the trustee becomes the proposer and the investor the responder in
this embedded ultimatum game.
Let us assume now that each investor is perfectly rational and has a return threshold t: If a trustee's
q is less than t, the investor transfers nothing. If a trustee's q is greater than t, the investor transfers
p. Investors can have different return thresholds. In our previous work, we saw that investors can
obtain a larger share of the game's payoff if they all coordinate and simultaneously choose a large t.
However, such coordination is not evolutionarily stable: any single investor will want to lower his or
her t (at least until it reaches 1/b + e). Following (Nowak et al., 2000), we will see that an additional
piece of information will create an evolutionarily robust situation that favors investors.
Suppose that with probability s, the trustee is informed of the investor's return threshold t before
deciding how much to return. When this is the case, the trustee returns exactly t to the investor
and is thus awarded the transfer. When this is not the case, the trustee offers his original q, which
might be accepted or might be rejected by the investor. We call s the "aspiration knowledge level"
as it measures the extent to which trustees have knowledge of the rates of return to which investors
aspire.
Figure 2-4(a) shows how the average values of p, q, and t depend on the aspiration knowledge
level s. Averages are taken over all generations and over the entire population of investors. Since
the information availability is 1, p is also always 1. The average return threshold t tracks the average
fraction returned by trustees exactly. This is reasonable because the trustees who do best are those
who generally get to transact with investors (so their q's are larger than t's on average) but who do
not give back more than they need to (so their q's are not much larger than t's on average).
Both q and t increase as s increases. When trustees are generally unaware of the return thresholds
of investors (s small), investors with high return thresholds do not enter into as many profitable
transactions as investors with low thresholds do. Thus, investors learn that they should not demand
too high a rate of return. As s increases, trustees become increasingly aware of the return thresholds of
investors. Since a trustee adjusts his effective q when he knows the investor's t, it becomes profitable
for investors to demand a lot from trustees when s is large.
Figure 2-4(b) shows the average payoffs of investors and trustees as a function of s. When s ~ 0,
trustees capture most of the value, as we know from our previous investigations. But once s is
sufficiently large, investors capture most of the payoff. They get to "name their price." For values
of s in a particular range (near s ~ 0.1 in this case), investors and trustees share the game's proceeds
equally. We thus see that a second layer of information can lead to equitable outcomes in the trust
game.
2.4 Conclusion
We have shown two ways in which investors-the individuals who are putting their "capital" to use
in the trust game-can capture most of the game's proceeds, a situation that is not initially favored by
evolution. First, investors can "comparison shop," comparing multiple trustees before committing
to the transaction. Even when investors compare just two possible trustees, they reap most of the
profit, regardless of the information availability r or their own rationality level a. Trustees, however,
are still compensated for the value they provide as agents. Second, trustees can be provided with
some information about the rates of return desired by investors. When the (original) information
availability is high, the share of the payoff accruing to the investor grows linearly with the pervasiveness
of this second type of information (the "aspiration knowledge level").
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Figure 2-4: (a) The average values of p (the amount given by the investor), q (the fraction returned
by the trustee), and t (the investor's return threshold) as a function of the aspiration knowledge level
s. Since we are assuming the information availability r is 1, p is always 1. The average values of q
and t coincide because it is best for trustees to enter a lot of transactions (so a trustee's q should be
larger than the average t) but not to give more than necessary to investors (so a trustee's q should not
be too much larger than the average t). As the probability that a trustee knows an investor's return
threshold increases, it becomes increasingly profitable for an investor to demand a high return on her
investment: the probability of a lost transaction is small when s is large. (b) The analogous plot for
the average payoffs. When s is small, trustees capture most of the game's proceeds, a result previously
known. When s is large, investors do: they essentially get to "name their price" to trustees. For values
of s in a certain range (near s 0.1 here), the parties split the proceeds equitably. The population
size N is 25, the mutation rate p is 0.005, the selection intensity P is 20, and the value of agency b is
4. Each generation consists of 500 random games.
Part II
Transitions in prebiotic chemistry
Chapter 3
The originator equation
Michael L. Manapat, Hisashi Ohtsuki, Reinliard Burger, and Martin A. Nowak
Abstract We study the origin of evolution. Evolution is based on replication, mutation, and selec-
tion. But how does evolution begin? When do chemical kinetics turn into evolutionary dynamics?
We propose "prelife" and "prevolution" as the logical precursors of life and evolution. Prelife gen-
erates sequences of variable length. Prelife is a generative chemistry that proliferates information and
produces diversity without replication. The resulting "prevolutionary dynamics" have mutation and
selection. We propose an equation that allows us to investigate the origin of evolution. In one limit,
this "originator equation" gives the classical selection equation. In the other limit, we obtain "pre-
life." There is competition between life and prelife and there can be selection for or against replication.
Simple prelife equations with uniform rate constants have the property that longer sequences are ex-
ponentially less frequent than shorter ones. But replication can reverse such an ordering. As the
replication rate increases, some longer sequences can become more frequent than shorter ones. Thus,
replication can lead to "reversals" in the equilibrium portraits. We study these reversals, which mark
the transition from prelife to life in our model. If the replication potential exceeds a critical value,
then life replicates into existence.
3.1 Introduction
The attempt to understand the origin of life has inspired much empirical and theoretical work over
the years. Some basic building blocks of living systems can be produced under simple, prebiotic
conditions (Miller, 1953; Szostak et al., 2001; Benner et al., 2002; Ricardo et al., 2004). RNA can
store genetic information and catalyze certain reactions (Ellington and Szostak, 1990; Cech, 1993;
Sievers and von Kiedrowski, 1994; Ferris et al., 1996; Joyce, 1989, 2002; Johnston et al., 2001). This
idea has led to the hypothesis of an RNA world, where both genetics and metabolism are governed
by RNA alone. In one experiment, Bartel and Szostak (1993) isolated a ribozyme from a large
number of randomly generated sequences. This ribozyme can ligate two RNA molecules that are
aligned on a template. Subsequent experiments have resulted in the shortening of this ribozyme and
the enhancement of its catalytic activity (Steitz and Moore, 2003).
Eigen (1971) and Eigen and Schuster (1977, 1979) have introduced a chemical theory for the
origin of life. They study populations of binary sequences under mutation and selection. A central
result of their celebrated "quasispecies theory" is the error threshold: adaptation is only possible if
the mutation rate per bit is less than the inverse of the sequence length (Swetina and Schuster, 1982;
McCaskill, 1984; Eigen et al., 1988; Nowak and Schuster, 1989; Nowak, 1992). They also propose
the hypercycle as a concept for the evolution of further complexity.
Kauffman (1986, 1993) investigates catalytic protein networks in the context of the origin of life.
Szathmary and Demeter (1987) study replicating units within randomly dividing vesicles. Fontana
and Buss (1994a,b) use the A-calculus as a tool for investigating how a generative chemistry can lead to
biological organization and evolution. For further theoretical approaches to questions concerning the
origin of life, see Dyson (1982, 1999), Stein and Anderson (1984), (Maynard Smith and Szathmiry,
1995), and Segre et al. (1998, 2000).
Evolutionary dynamics need populations of individuals that are capable of reproduction and in-
heritance. Offspring inherit some information from their parents. If the term "replication" is used
specifically to denote the reproduction of information, then biology becomes the study of replication.
Mutation arises if replication is not perfectly accurate but can also generate mistakes. Selection
emerges if mutants differ in their replication rate, which is also called their "fitness." Thus, evolu-
tionary dynamics are based on replication, mutation, and selection.
It is generally assumed that mutation and selection are consequences of replication, but here
we want to challenge this perspective. We propose a generative chemistry (prelife) that is capable of
mutation and selection prior to replication. We study how selection can favor (or oppose) replication.
Consider a binary soup of activated monomers, 0* and 1*. These monomers are produced and
removed at certain rates. In addition, the following chemical reactions are possible:
i+0* - iO, (3.1)
i+1* - il.
Here i denotes any binary sequence (including the null sequence). We make several assumptions
about this chemical system. First, we assume that some buffering mechanism exists so that the con-
centrations of the activated monomers are always at a fixed steady-state level. Second, we assume that
elongation can occur in only one direction: sequence i can become i0 or i1. This is analogous to the
polymerization of DNA where a new base can only be added to the 3' end. Under this assumption,
each string has a unique chemical precursor and exactly two successors. For example, the precursor
of sequence 001 is 00 and its two successors are 0010 and 0011. In particular, each string has a unique
production lineage: the lineage of 0010 is 0 - 00 - 001 -- 0010. Finally, we assume that strings of
all lengths are removed at a fixed "death-rate" d. One can view sequence death as the degradation of
the string into its constituent monomers, which are then absorbed into the buffered pool of activated
monomers.
The dynamics within this binary soup are described by the following system of infinitely many
differential equations, where the abundance of sequence i is given by xi:
si = aixil - (aio + ai1 + d)xi = 0,1,00,01,.... (3.2)
The parameter ai denotes the rate constant of the chemical reaction which produces sequence i
from its precursor i'. For the abundances of the precursors of 0 and 1, we set xo' = x1, = 1. All
sequences are removed at rate d. The above system converges to a unique equilibrium where, typically,
longer sequences are exponentially less common than shorter ones. For a discussion of prevolutionary
dynamics, see Nowak and Ohtsuki (2008).
Let us now assume that (some) sequences can reproduce. In the simplest scenario, they use
activated monomers to make copies of themselves. This is called "direct replication" rather than
replication via the complimentary bitstring (Eigen and Schuster, 1979). Suppose the relative repli-
cation rate (i.e., the fitness) of sequence i is given by fi. We then have the following "originator
equation":
.i = aixif - (ao + ai1 + d)xi + rxi(fi - p), i = 0,1,00,01,.... (3.3)
The parameter r determines the relative magnitude of replication and prelife dynamics. It could
depend on the supply of activated monomers or other chemical and physical properties of the system,
such as the temperature. In the limit r -+ 0, the originator equation describes prelife, (3.2). In the
limit r -+ oo, we obtain the standard selection equation of evolutionary dynamics (Nowak, 2006).
The parameter 0 is chosen so that the total population size is constant. Without loss of generality we
set Ei xi = 1, so xi denotes the frequency of sequence i. Since we must require that E 0, we
obtain
f + ao + ai - d. (3.4)
The average fitness of the population is f Ei fixi . If we set ao + ai = d, then 4 = f.
In this paper, we will study some aspects of system (3.3), but we will mostly investigate a somewhat
simpler equation which shares many properties with (3.3). This unary originator equation has the
form
-i = ai_1 xi_1 - (at + d)xi + rxi(fi -4), i=1,2,3,.... (3.5)
Here xi is the abundance of the sequence of length i. As before, sequences grow on one side by the
addition of activated monomers, but now there is only one type of monomer, 0*. Thus we study
the unary sequences 0,00,000,.. For the abundance of the precursor of 0, we set xo = 1. We can
interpret the unary model as a binary model where all the properties of a sequence depend only on
its length: the abundance xi in the unary model corresponds to the total abundance of all strings of
length i in the binary model. In addition, if we assume that all sequences of a given length and greater
have the same fitness, the unary originator equation (3.5) can be written as a quasispecies equation
with a very special mutation-selection matrix. The details of this reduction are described in Section
3.3.
We will investigate the equilibrium structure of (3.5) as function of the replication potential, r.
If r is less than a critical value, then the basic equilibrium structure of prelife prevails. Our focus will
be on the symmetric case given by ai = a for i > 0 and ao = d, which implies that p = f. Note that
p is a function of xi and not a constant. For r = 0 (prelife), longer sequences are always less frequent
than shorter ones. But as r increases there can be "reversals" in the equilibrium portrait after which
some sequences become more frequent than their precursors.
3.2 The unary model
We study system (3.5) where x0 = 1, ao = d, and ai = a for all i > 0. In this case, the system becomes
j21 = d - (a + d)x1 + rx1(f1 - 0),
.i = axi_1 - (a + d)xi + rxi(fi - p), i =2,3,..., (3.6)
o
p=(fixi.
i=1
Here xi denotes the frequency (i.e., the relative abundance) of the sequence of length i. We will
assume that all sufficiently long sequences have the same fitness. This assumption allows us to per-
form exact numerical simulations and also guarantees that the system has a unique, globally stable
equilibrium in the infinite simplex Ei xi = 1, xi > 0 for all i. In the next section, we provide a
detailed discussion of how we simulate the system along with a discussion of its stability properties.
3.3 Mathematical analysis
3.3.1 Reduction to the quasispecies equation
We now describe how we transform (3.6) to make it a finite system, and we deduce the uniqueness
and stability of its equilibrium point in the simplex by reduction to the quasispecies equation. We
will assume that all sequences of length > N have the same fitness f.
We start with system (3.6),
21 = d - (a + d)x1 +rx1 (f1 - 0),
,i= axi_1 - (a + d)xi + rxi(fi - p), i = 2,3,...,
p = [ fixi,
where a, d > 0, but now we assume that fi = f for all i > N. We introduce a new variable y
representing the aggregate frequency of all strings of length > N:
oo
y= xi. (3.7)
i=N+1
We then have
i=N+1
= a (0 xi - (a + d) 1: xi + r(f - 0 { xi (3.8)
i=N i=N+1 i=N+1
=axN - dy + ry(f - 0).
We thus obtain a finite system of differential equations,
,t1 = d - (a + d)x1 + rx1 (f1 - 0),
±i = axi_1 - (a + d) xi + rxi (fi - p), i =2, 3,. ..., N., (3.9)
Y = axN - dy + ry(f - p),
where 0 = fix1 + -- + fNxN + fy. We can simulate the finite system (3.9) numerically without in-
troducing any approximations: the trajectories and the equilibrium frequencies of sequences 1,.,N
deterrined by the simulation will be the same as the equilibrium frequencies of those sequences in
the infinite system.
We now investigate the equilibrium properties of (3.6). Let
fyr+d d d ... d d x1
a f2 r 0 ... 0 0 X2
W= 0 a f3r --- 0 0 and X= : (3.10)
NA-i
0 0 0 .-- a fr+a y
W is nonnegative andalways irreducible. We will assume that r > 0 and that at least one fi > 0 so
that W is also aperiodic. When r = 0, originator dynamics reduce to prelife dynamics, for which the
uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium is well-known (Nowak and Ohtsuki, 2008).
On the simplex x1 +- -+ xN + y 1, (3.9) is equivalent to the matrix equation
X WX -- ropi - (a + dY (311( . )
=WY - (r p + a + d j .
Note that, formally, (3.11) is the quasispecies equation (Eigen, 1971; Eigen and Schuster, 1977, 1979;
Nowak, 2006). The equilibrium of originator dynamics is given by
WY = (rp + a + d). (3.12)
This is exactly the equation for the equilibrium of quasispecies dynamics-W can be viewed as an
ergodic (i.e., irreducible and aperiodic) mutation-selection matrix-so there is a unique, globally
stable equilibrium in the (N + 1)-dimensional simplex (Burger, 2000). This implies that originator
dynamics (of the infinite system) converge to a "quasi-equilibrium" where the frequencies of se-
quences 1 to N and the aggregate frequency of strings of length > N are given by the equilibrium
frequencies of the finite system (3.9). This does not immediately show, however, that the frequencies
XN+1, XN+2, -.. have unique and stable equilibrium values.
We can now proceed by induction for M > N given our assumption that fi = f for i > N.
For M, we obtain an equilibrium solution of the finite-dimensional system that has the property that
the equilibrium frequencies x of the system of dimension M +1 coincide with those of dimension
M if i < M. This implies that the infinite-dimensional system has an equilibrium solution that can
be constructed in this way (clearly it sums to 1) and it is unique. Since we obtain global conver-
gence to the unique equilibrium solution for every transformed system (of dimension M), we obtain
convergence of all trajectories in the infinite system.
3.3.2 Lack of stochastic effects
The originator equation (3.9) is a system of (deterministic) differential equations that is meant to
describe what, in reality, is a stochastic system with a finite-sometimes small-number of molecules.
To check that stochastic effects do not dominate, we performed two sets of simulations (with several
values of r) for a representative fitness landscape-sequences of length 7 and 8 have fitness 1 and all
other sequences have fitness 0. Our methodology was based on the Gillespie algorithm (Gillespie,
1977). In the first set of simulations, we started with 100,000 (unactivated) monomers and allowed
one billion random reactions to occur (this was enough for the distribution of frequencies to be
stationary). Each reaction was a sequence elongation, sequence death, or sequence replication. We
then computed the frequency of each sequence. We repeated this procedure five times and computed
the average frequency of each sequence over all the trials. In the second set of simulations, we started
the system with an equal number of sequences of length 1-10, but all other aspects were the same. In
both cases, we found that the stochastic simulations agreed with our deterministic ones. Table 3.3.2
presents the detailed results.
3.4 Reversals
We will focus on the "reversal points" in the equilibrium portraits of system (3.6). For each value
of r, we plot the equilibrium frequencies, x,*(r). As r varies, these frequencies can change order,
and the values of r at which they do so are what we call reversal points. We are interested in these
points because they mark the transition from prelife dynamics to evolutionary dynamics in the orig-
inator equation. Before a reversal, the chemically-determined structure of prelife is dominant; after
a reversal, replication dominates.
Figure 3-1 shows the equilibrium portrait of a random fitness landscape: sequences of length 5-24
have fitness values chosen from the uniform distribution on [1, 1.1]. The sequence of length 14 (in
red) has the highest fitness. We will find lower bounds for the values of r at which reversals such as
those near r = 1 can occur. This will allow us to make statements about necessary conditions on
replication rates for life to dominate prelife.
The equilibrium structure in symmetric prelife is characterized by an inverse relationship between
frequency and sequence length: longer sequences are less common than shorter ones. When some
sequences have positive fitness, however, they may become more abundant than shorter sequences
if r is large enough. In Figure 3-1, the sequence of length 14 has the highest fitness and eventually
becomes the most frequent sequence. However, its frequency does not increase monotonically as a
function of r. From r a 1 to ~ 10, the frequency of the fittest sequence actually decreases.
We start by establishing a lower bound for the values of r at which reversals can occur. In the
following, we will speak of "sequence i," by which we mean the sequence of length i, the "frequency
of i," by which we mean the equilibrium frequency of sequence i, and of "frequencies" generally, by
which we mean the equilibrium frequencies of the sequences as functions of the parameter r. When
we describe the behavior of sequences (e.g., in phrases such as "sequence i crosses sequence j at ro"),
we are referring to the equilibrium frequencies of the sequences as functions of r.
3.4.1 General lower bounds for reversals
We begin with the basic requirements that fi > 0 for all i, at least one sequence has positive fitness,
and all sufficiently long sequences have the same fitness. These conditions ensure that (3.6) has a
unique, globally stable equilibrium. Observe that the first intersection of sequences must involve the
intersection of a sequence and its precursor. Therefore, it is enough to find a value of r below which
r Sequence Length Deterministic Stochastic (M) Stochastic (E)1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
> 10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
> 10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
> 10
0.500000
0.250000
0.125000
0.062500
0.031250
0.015625
0.007813
0.003906
0.001953
0.000977
0.000977
0.493187
0.243233
0.119959
0.059162
0.029178
0.014390
0.014003
0.013627
0.006721
0.003314
0.003225
0.441400
0.194834
0.086000
0.037960
0.016756
0.007396
0.027855
0.104905
0.046305
0.020439
0.016151
0.500072
0.249553
0.125287
0.062594
0.031095
0.015618
0.007959
0.004069
0.001820
0.001027
0.000906
0.493156
0.243205
0.119959
0.059153
0.029193
0.014400
0.013996
0.013665
0.006722
0.003319
0.003231
0.441449
0.194908
0.086001
0.037973
0.016763
0.007403
0.027812
0.104837
0.046274
0.020426
0.016154
0.501320
0.250157
0.124887
0.061808
0.031161
0.015249
0.007679
0.003885
0.001935
0.000921
0.000998
0.493147
0.243206
0.120018
0.059162
0.029187
0.014390
0.014010
0.013624
0.006720
0.003315
0.003221
0.441402
0.194810
0.860050
0.037961
0.016750
0.007397
0.027800
0.104907
0.046306
0.020437
0.016145
Table 3.1: A comparison of the equilibrium frequences computed by a deterministic simulation of
(3.9) to the stationary frequencies computed by stochastic simulations. We simulated the fitness
landscape in which sequences 7 and 8 have fitness 1 and all other sequences have fitness 0. The
"Deterministic" column gives the equilibrium frequences computed by the deterministic simula-
tion, "Stochastic (M)" gives the (average) stationary frequences when the system was started with
100,000 unactivated monomers and nothing else, and "Stochastic (E)" gives the (average) stationary
frequencies when the system was started with an equal number of sequences of length 1 to 10 (10,000
each).
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Figure 3-1: The equilibrium portrait of the unary originator equation with a = d = 1. Sequences
5-24 (dark blue) have fitness values sampled from the uniform distribution on [1, 1.1]. All other
sequences have fitness 0. Each curve is the graph of the equilibrium frequency x* = x*(r) of a
sequence of a particular length. The red curve is the graph of x 4 (r), the equilibrium frequency of
sequence 14, which is the fittest sequence in this landscape. Surprisingly, the frequency of the fittest
sequence does not increase monotonically: between r ~ 1 and ~ 10, x44(r) actually decreases.
a sequence and its precursor cannot intersect. From (3.6), we have at equilibrium
x* = ax* (3.13)
i+ 1 (a + d) - r(fi+1 - 0*)
where * Efix*. If x+1 = x , we must have
a = (3.14)
(a + d) - r(fi+1 - #*)
This equality holds if r(fi+1 - 0*) = d, and for this we must have fi+1 > 0*. These conditions
become
d d
r = > . (3.15)fi+1 - $P* fi+1
Thus, if the frequencies of i and i + 1 intersect, they do so only if r > .
We can justify this result intuitively as follows: each sequence has an input flow from its precursor
(rate a), an output flow to its successor (rate a), and a death rate d. The absolute replication rate,
rfi+1, of sequence i + 1 must exceed the death rate, d, to make net replication possible; the result is
the bound r > d/fi+1-
We note that (3.15) implies that a nonreplicating sequence, i-+1, will never cross its precursor, I:
if fi+1 = 0, the bound becomes infinity.
Taking into account all pairs of frequencies, we find that an intersection between any sequences
can happen only if
r > min d (3.16)
i fi
If r is less than the quantity on the right, then the equilibrium structure of prelife is maintained; as r
increases beyond that value, we can have a transition after which the balance is tipped in favor of life
(though nonreplicating sequences may still be more frequent than replicating ones). We collect the
results above in the following theorem.
T heorem 3.1. Let {fi}_1 be a fitness landscape such that fi > Ofor all i, fj > Ofor some j, and fk = f for
all sufficiently large k (f a fixed nonnegative number). Then
1. The equilibrium frequencies x* (r) and xi+1 (r) do not intersect for r < d/fi+1.
2. A nonreplicating sequence never intersects its precursor (the sequence of length one less).
3. There are no intersections between any sequences for r < mini d/fi.
Theorem 3.1 gives necessary but not sufficient conditions on r for reversals to occur. A reversal
can fail to occur, even if r is sufficiently large, in one of two ways. First, the sequences can fail to
intersect at all. In Section 3.4.3, we give an example of a fitness landscape in which many sequences
can replicate but for which there are no intersections. Second, even if a group of sequences meets at
a certain point, their order does not necessarily have to change after that point-the frequencies can
be mutually tangent. Equality (3.14) is technically only a condition for intersection and not one for
reversal. However, we have not observed, numerically, any situations in which two frequencies are
tangent.
3.4.2 Sequences m to n replicate
Suppose sequences m to n have fitness f > 0 and all other sequences have fitness 0. Figure 3-2 shows
the equilibrium portrait for m = 3, n = 15, and f = 1. Surprisingly, the frequencies of sequences
m - 1 (= 2) to n (= 15) intersect in a single point at r ~ 3.31. To see this, observe that (3.14) implies
that sequence n crosses sequence n - 1 at values of r satisfying
d r p*
r = - + .* (3.17)f f
The same is true for sequences n - 1 and n - 2, n - 2 and n - 3, etc., up to m and m - 1 since
sequences m to n all have the same fitness. Thus at any r at which a replicating sequence crosses its
precursor, all the replicating sequences cross their precursors and the frequencies of m - 1 to n are
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Figure 3-2: The equilibrium portrait of the unary originator equation (3.6) with a d 1. Se-
quences 3-15 (dark blue) have fitness 1, and all other sequences have fitness 0. Each curve is the
graph of the equilibrium frequency x* = x* (r) of a sequence of a particular length. The equilibrium
frequencies of sequences 2-15 all intersect at r ~ 3.31. In general, if sequences m to n have the sanie
fitness f and all other sequences have fitness 0, then the frequencies of sequences m - 1 to n will
intersect for the first time in a single point.
equal. Generalizing to arbitrary fitness landscapes, we observe that a sequence of fitness f intersects
its precursor at values of r satisfying (3.17) and that this r is independent of the length of the sequence.
We thus obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 3.2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.1, if a sequence withfitness f crosses its precursor at r = ro,
then all sequences with fitness f cross their precursors at r = ro. In particular, the value of ro does not depend on
thefitness of the precursor.
For r = 0, the prelife equilibrium structure is intact and sequences are ordered by sequence length.
As r increases and selection dynamics become important, there is a value of r at which the frequencies
of m - 1 to n are all equal. Thus if we have a series of consecutive sequences of the same fitness, they
first intersect in a single point. Life is then selected over prelife only after all replicating sequences
have achieved the same (equilibrium) frequency.
The equilibrium portrait of Figure 3-3 shows two groups of replicating sequences: 3-8, which
have fitness 1, and 15-20, which also have fitness 1. The frequencies of sequences 2-8 meet at r ~ 2.27
as do those of 14-20-the first intersections occur at the same r since all replicating sequences have
the same fitness.
Now suppose sequences m to n have fitness 1, with the exception of sequences i to j (m < i <
j < n), which have fitness f > 1. The fittest sequences cannot cross their precursors before r = dIf
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Figure 3-3: The equilibrium portrait of the unary originator equation (3.6) with a d 1. Se-
quences 3-8 and 15-20 (dark blue) have fitness 1, and all other sequences have fitness 0. Each curve
is the graph of the equilibrium frequency x* = x* (r) of a sequence of a particular length. The fre-
quency of sequences 2-8 all intersect at r ~ 2.27 as do the frequencies of sequences 14-20 since all
replicating sequences have the same fitness. In general, if sequence i has fitness f and x = x*_1 at
r = ro, then x* = xJ_1 at r = ro for all sequences j with fitness f.
and the sequences of intermediate fitness cannot cross their precursors before r = d. However, from
our simulations, we know that there are not necessarily going to be intersections of both types.
In Figure 3-4(a), sequences 4-18 have fitness 1, with the exception of sequence 10, which has
fitness 1.5. Sequence 10 (the dashed line) crosses sequence 9 at r - 0.91 whereas the sequences with
fitness 1 do not cross their precursors. In Figure 3-4(b), sequences 4-18 have fitness 1, with the
exception of sequence 10, which has fitness 1.1. Sequence 10 crosses sequence 9 at r a 1.41 whereas
sequences 3-9 cross at r a 2.19, as do sequences 10-18.
3.4.3 Sequences 1 to n replicate
While life cannot dominate before r = mini d/fi, it is possible for the prelife structure to remain
intact in some cases regardless of how large r is. Here we give an example of such a landscape.
Consider the situation in which sequences 1 to n have the same fitness f. Figure 3-5 shows the
case n = 20 and f = 1. We know that a nonreplicating sequence never intersects its precursor. If
there are any intersections, they must involve two replicating sequences and thus must be preceded
by the intersection of a replicating sequence and its precursor, say i and i + 1 (1 ; i < n). From the
analysis above, we know that sequences with the same replication rate intersect their precursors at
the same values of r. Thus if sequences i and i + 1 first intersect at ro, then sequences 1 to n must all
10
10-~1
-2
10
-3
10
-4
10
-6
10
10
9
10
10 .10
-2 1012 310 10 10 10 10 10(a) Replication potential, r
0
10
10
-2
10
-3
10
--10aL 
-6
10......
-7
10
-810
-910
10 1
-2 -10 12 310 10 10 10 10 10
(b) Replication potential,
Figure 3-4: The equilibrium portrait of the unary originator equation (3.6) with a d 1. (a)
Sequences 4-18 (dark blue) have fitness 1, with exception of sequence 10 (red), which has fitness
1.5, and all other sequences have fitness 0. Each curve is the graph of the equilibrium frequency
x7 = x7(r) of a sequence of a particular length. According to (3.15), the frequency of sequence 10
can intersect the frequency of sequence 9 only when r > 1/1.5 = 0.66 and the frequencies of the
sequences of fitness 1 can intersect their predecessors only when r > 1. In this case, however, there
are no intersections of the latter type. (b) The same fitness landscape as in (a), but now sequence 10
has fitness 1.1. In this case there are five intersections: sequence 10 crosses its predecessor at r - 1/1.1,
sequences 3-9 cross at r a 1 and then again at r a 10, and sequences 10-18 cross at r a 1 and r a 10
as well. The sequences within each of these two groups cross at the same values of r since sequences
with the same fitness cross their predecessors at the same values of r.
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Figure 3-5: The equilibrium portrait of the unary originator equation (3.6) with a = d 1. Se-
quences 1-20 (dark blue) have fitness 1, and all other sequences have fitness 0. Each curve is the graph
of the equilibrium frequency x* = x* (r) of a sequence of a particular length. Even if sequences 1-20
replicate, there are no reversals: the prelife structure of the population is maintained even in the limit
r -+ oo.
intersect at ro. To show that there are no intersections, then, it is enough to show that sequences 1
and 2 never meet. We have
d(a + d) - r(f - 0*)' (3.18)
* X1X2 (a + d) - r(f - 0*)
Sequences 1 and 2 have the same frequency only if x* = x* = d. If d > 1/2, this cannot happen.
3.5 Analytic calculation of an intersection in a special case
In the previous section, we found a lower bound for the values of r at which sequences can intersect,
but there was no guarantee that there would be a reversal-or even just an intersection-if r exceeded
that bound. In this section, we give an example in which we can guarantee-and compute the
coordinates of-an intersection.
For simplicity, we set f2 = - = fn = 1, all other fi = 0, and a = d = 1, though what follows
also applies for general a and d. Figure 3-6 shows the n = 20 case. At equilibrium, system (3.6)
becomes
1 - 2x - rx*p* = 0,
xt - 2x* + rx2(1 - p*) = 0,
(3.19)
x*_1 - 2x* + rx* (1 - p*) = 0,
x* - 2x*+1 - rx p* = 0,
We know from Section 3.4.2 that if there are intersections involving any of the sequences 1,...,n,
they must be preceded by the simultaneous intersection of all n sequences. We will thus attempt to
find a point at which such an n-way intersection occurs: we seek an intersection point of sequences
1 and 2 while assuming that sequences 1 to n meet there. This will give us an analytic condition on
r. If we can find an r that satisfies it, we will have both confirmed the existence of the intersection
point and determined the value of r at which it occurs. Now at this point, we have
n
rp* = r x = (n - 1)rx*. (3.20)
i=2
Here x* denotes the common equilibrium frequency of the first n sequences. Thus, the first two
equations in (3.19) become
-(n - 1)rx*2 - 2x* +1=0 (3.21)
(n - 1)rx* - (r - 1) = 0.
Solving (3.21) gives us
r (n - 1) + s/(n - 1)2 +4 (3.22)
2
and
(n - 3) + 1(n - 1)2 +4
(n - 1)2 + (n - 1) /(n - 1)2 + 4(
For n = 20, this gives r a 19.0525 and x* ~ 0.0499. Note that there are two solutions for r in system
(3.21), but one is negative and one is positive. Hence, there is precisely one positive value of r at
which the frequencies of sequences 1 to n are equal. For large n, we obtain r = n from (3.22) and
x* = 1/n from (3.23).
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Figure 3-6: The equilibrium portrait of the unary originator equation (3.6) with a d = 1. Se-
quences 2-20 (dark blue) have fitness 1, and all other sequences have fitness 0. Each curve is the graph
of the equilibrium frequency x' = x, (r) of a sequence of a particular length. In contrast to the fitness
landscape of Figure 3-5, here the frequencies of sequences 1-20 meet at r = (19 + 192+ 4) /2 ~ 20.
3.6 The fastest replicator is not always the most abundant
Figure 3-7(a) is an equilibrium portrait of the fitness landscape fio = 1, fu = 0.95, and fi = 0 for
all i 3 10,11. Despite the facts that the initial (prelife) frequency of sequence 10 is greater than that
of sequence 11 and that sequence 10 has a higher fitness than sequence 11, between r ~ 1 and ~ 20,
the longer, less fit sequence (11) is more frequent. In fact, for r between approximately 2 and 20,
sequence 11 dominates the entire population. We now study this phenomenon.
We consider fitness landscapes with fi < fN+1 < fN for all i # N, N + 1. We would like
to approximate the values of r for which the longer, less fit sequence can be more frequent than
the fittest sequence. A perturbation theory argument allows us to estimate the average fitness 0* at
equilibrium for landscapes of this type. For the unary model (3.6), we obtain the equilibrium solution
d
x* = d(3.24)
1(a + d) - r(fi - 0*)'
axn1 a-d(3.25)
n (a + d) - r(fn -ni *n[(a + d) - r(fi - *)] r l .
Since we are seeking an asymptotic expansion in the limit r -+ oo, we set e =1/r and let e - 0.
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Figure 3-7: The equilibrium portrait of the unary originator equation (3.6) with a = d = 1. (a)
Sequence 10 (red) has fitness 1, sequence 11 (dark blue) has fitness 0.95, and all other sequences
have fitness 0. Each curve is the graph of the equilibrium frequency x = xj*(r) of a sequence of
a particular length. Even if sequence 10 has an initial (when r = 0) frequency greater than that of
sequence 11 and a higher fitness, between r ~ 1 and r ~ 20, x*1 > x*0 . The real positive roots of
the polynomial 0.05x' 0 - x +1 are the values of r at which x*0 (r) = x 1 (r). (b) A comparison of
the average fitness at equilibrium, p*(r), of the fitness landscape of (a) to the perturbation theory
estimate (3.32). The actual average fitness and the estimate essentially coincide for r > 2.
From (3.24), we obtain straightforwardly
* = d - = d + O(e2), (3.26a)c(a + d) + (p-f) 0* 
-10
x* = caxnI axn-1 +( 2xn_1), (3.26b)
" c(a + d) + (p* -fn) 0* -fn
where in both cases the second equality requires p -fi = 0(1) for i = 1 or i = n, respectively. In
particular, if f* - 0(1) for every i = 1,... , n, we obtain from (3.26) by iteration
x* = ") + O(en+1). (3.27)
" = ]-_W$ - fi)
Now assume that sequence N has the highest fitness, N + 1 has the second highest fitness, and all
other sequences are less fit, i.e., fi < fN+1 < fN for all i / N, N + 1. If c = 0, then p* = fN and
x* = 1. Hence, for small c, we have x* = 1 + O(c). From (3.26b), we infer that this requires
cax*l
1 + O(e) =Nax-1 .(3.28)
ec(a + d) + (0* - fN)
Since we must also have p* = fN+ O(e) and because fi < fN for every i, (3.27) yields
x -1 N1 aN 2 d E(cN). (3.29)
H2 (fN - fi)
By rearranging (3.28) and substituting (3.29), we obtain
cax*
* =fN- e(a + d) + 1 Ne)
HfN(- (a + d) + (N cN1 N+1) as e -+ 0. (3.30)
I_-1 (fN - i,)
Because e = 1/r, this is equivalent to
a + d 1 aN-1d
0*(r) =fN - T N FN1 yN - i rN+1 *(3'31)
For the fitness landscape of Figure 3-7(a) and our choice of parameters (a d = 1), the approx-
imation becomes
a~d a 9 d(/1 \
p*(r) fN- a + a 1 + O
r r r (3.32)2 2 1i
=1- +r10 r11'~r r 0 (\T]
Figure 3-7(b) is a comparison of this estimate to the actual average fitness; the estimate essentially
coincides with the actual average fitness for r > 2.
Now as we saw above, the frequency of sequence N + 1 will be greater than the frequency of
sequence N precisely when
a >1. (3.33)
a + d - r(fN+- *)
Substituting (3.31) into (3.33) and rearranging terms, we see that sequence N + 1 will be more
frequent than sequence N if
aN-1d
r(fN1-fN)+a -1 '>03
where P = ]-Hfi(fN - fi). Without loss of generality, we set a = 1, fN = 1, and fN+1 - s,
where 0 < s < 1 (we are thus assuming that fi < 1 - s for i : N, N + 1). Condition (3.34) then
becomes
g(r) := srN - rN-1 + < 0. (3.35)
The real roots of this polynomial (if there are any) give approximations to the values of r at which
the frequencies of sequences N and N + 1 cross.
We study this polynomial in the special case d = P = 1 (the fitness landscape in Figure 3-7(a)
satisfies these conditions). Let k = 1/s. Finding the roots of g is equivalent to finding the roots of
h(r) := rN - krN-1 + k. Taking derivatives, we have
h'(r) = rN-2 (Nr - k(N - 1)), (3.36)
h"(r) = (N - 1)rN-3 (Nr - k(N - 2)).
There is precisely one positive root ro = k(N - 1)/N of h' (and this root is not a root of h") and the
condition h(ro) < 0 is equivalent to
kN-1 \ N
N 1 N > 1. (3.37)N - 1 N
When k and N satisfy this condition, h(r) will have exactly two positive real roots. The smaller one
is the value of r at which the frequency of sequence N + 1 exceeds that of sequence N. The larger
one is the value of r at which sequence N starts to dominate the population. For large N, (3.37) can
be rewritten as kN > eN.
When inequality (3.37) holds and h has two real roots, the larger one is approximately equal to
k. To see this, observe that h(k) = k > 0 and h'(r) > 0 for r > k, so h can have no roots larger than
k. Since h(ro) < 0, it follows that h has a root between ro = k - k/N and k. In fact it can have only
one root in that interval since h' never vanishes for r > ro. We can interpret this in the following
way: if the fittest sequence has advantage s over the next fittest sequence, then the fittest sequence
10 0.01 0 1.014 1.001 100.000 100.000
10 0.05 0 1.057 1.006 20.000 20.000
10 0.10 0 1.116 1.012 10.000 10.000
10 0.01 0.33 1.520 1.495 100.000 100.000
10 0.05 0.33 1.619 1.506 20.000 20.000
10 0.05 0.33 1.762 1.520 10.000 10.000
10 0.01 0.5 2.047 2.005 100.000 100.000
10 0.05 0.5 2.230 2.024 20.000 20.000
10 0.10 0.5 2.511 2.052 10.000 10.000
20 0.01 0 1.010 1.001 100.000 100.000
20 0.05 0 1.053 1.003 20.000 20.000
20 0.10 0 1.111 1.006 10.000 10.000
20 0.01 0.33 1.515 1.494 100.000 100.000
20 0.05 0.33 1.613 1.499 20.000 20.000
20 0.10 0.33 1.754 1.505 10.000 10.000
20 0.01 0.5 2.041 2.002 100.000 100.000
20 0.05 0.5 2.222 2.011 20.000 20.000
20 0.10 0.5 2.500 2.024 10.000 10.000
Table 3.2: A comparison of the actual and estimated values of r at which the equilibrium frequencies
of sequences N and N + 1 cross (ri is the r-value of the first reversal and rh the value of the second)
when sequence N has fitness 1, sequence N + 1 has fitness 1 - s, sequences of length < N have a
fixed fitness less than 1 - s, and all other sequences have fitness 0. We set a = d = 1. The estimates
are obtained by finding the real positive roots of the polynomial (3.35).
can dominate the population only if
1
r > -. (3.38)
s
For r < 1/s, sequences of intermediate fitness can be most frequent. Table 3.6 gives the values for
the real and estimated crossing points of sequences N and N + 1 for various values of N and s. In all
cases, the estimate 1/s for the second point, after which sequence N can dominate, coincides with
the numerical determination of the last crossing point.
3.7 The binary model
The results above apply to the case of the binary originator equation with slight modifications. Here
we carry out one explicit computation. The analogue of (3.6) in the binary case is
xi = aixii - (aio + ai1 + d )xi +rxi(fi -p), i = 0,1,00,01,.... (3.39)
As in (3.13), we can write
a -
x* =x'*. (3.40)(aio + aii + d) - r(fi - $*) 1
N s fi (i < N) ri (Actual) ri (Estimate) rh(Actual) rh(Estimate)
For the frequencies of i and i' to cross, the fractional quantity must be 1. This condition becomes
r = a fo +aii -ai + r*. (3.41)fi fi
For the symmetric case (aio = ai = ai = a) we have
a + d rp* a + d
r = + -> .(3.42)fi fi fi
In symmetric binary prelife, all sequences of the same length have the same equilibrium frequency;
for the frequency of a sequence to increase above that of its precursor, we need r > (a + d)/fi. In
contrast to the unary case, the net flow to successors due to prelife occurs at rate a + d (since there
are now two downstream flows of rate a to a sequence's successors). Net replication then becomes
possible when the absolute replication rate rfi exceeds a + d, giving (3.42).
3.8 Conclusion
We have introduced the originator equation, a model that allows us to study the transition from the
generative chemistry of prelife-a system that proliferates information without replication-and its
prevolutionary dynamics to life and its evolutionary dynamics. The equilibrium portraits associated
to this model show how the frequencies of sequences vary as a function of the replication potential,
r. When these frequencies intersect, we have a transition after which life dominates prelife.
We derived a "local" lower bound (3.15) for r below which a sequence and its precursor cannot
cross and a "global" lower bound (3.16),
.*d
r > mm-
i fi
below which no sequences can cross. We showed that r exceeding this bound is necessary but not
sufficient for a reversal to occur: when sequences 1 to n replicate with the same fitness, replication
cannot break the symmetry of the prelife structure.
For a special fitness landscape-when sequences 2 to n replicate with the same fitness-the first
and only n-way intersection of sequences 1 to n occurs at
(n-1)+ 1(n - 1)2 + 4r 2
2
For large n, this intersection point occurs at r - n.
For the fitness landscape in which sequence N has fitness 1, sequence N + 1 has fitness 1 - s
(0 < s < 1), and all other sequences have fitness 0, we showed that the real positive roots of the
polynomial
h(r) = srN _rN-1 +
approximate the values of r at which the equilibrium frequencies of sequences N and N + 1 intersect.
We have condition (3.37) under which the polynomial will in fact have two real positive roots and
showed that the larger of these roots is (to good approximation) equal to 1/s. Thus, if we have two
replicating sequences, N and N + 1, and sequence N has a fitness advantage of s, then the replication
potential must be at least 1/s for the fittest sequence to dominate-before that, sequence N + 1 can
be more abundant than sequence N.
In symmetric prelife, longer sequences are exponentially less frequent than shorter sequences.
When sequences replicate, however, the symmetry of the prelife ordering can be disrupted, and the
equilibrium distribution can be far from exponential: as r increases, selection becomes increasingly
efficient in removing all but the fittest sequences.
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Chapter 4
The basic reproductive ratio of life
Michael L. Manapat, Irene A. Chen, and Martin A. Nowak
Abstract Template-directed polymerization of nucleotides is believed to be a pathway for the repli-
cation of genetic material in the earliest cells. We assume that activated monomers are produced by
prebiotic chemistry. These monomers can undergo spontaneous polymerization, a system that we
call "prelife." Adding template-directed polymerization changes the equilibrium structure of prelife
if the rate constants meet certain criteria. In particular, if the basic reproductive ratio of sequences of
a certain length exceeds one, then those sequences can attain high abundance. Furthermore, if many
sequences replicate, then the longest sequences can reach high abundance even if the basic reproduc-
tive ratios of all sequences are less than one. We call this phenomenon "subcritical life." Subcritical
life suggests that sequences long enough to be ribozymes can become abundant even if replication is
relatively inefficient. Our work on the evolution of replication has interesting parallels to infection
dynamics. Life (replication) can be seen as an infection of prelife.
4.1 Introduction
Evolution is based on replication, mutation, and selection. Replication proliferates information.
Mutation results in errors in replication and thereby produces diversity. Selection occurs when some
mutants are more fit than others. In order to understand the beginning of evolution, we must un-
derstand the origins of replication. In our earlier work, we studied "prelife" dynamics and the onset
of replication (Nowak and Ohtsuki, 2008; Manapat et al., 2009; Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2009). Prelife
is a model of a soup of activated monomers that undergo spontaneous polymerization. How might
prebiotic replication occur in reality? Template-directed synthesis is believed to be a mechanism for
copying nucleic acid sequences before enzymes evolved (Ninio and Orgel, 1978; Lohrmann et al.,
1980; Joyce, 1987; Orgel, 2004a). In this mechanism, the template sequence accelerates polymer-
ization of a complementary strand through base-pairing interactions with the nucleotide monomers.
This effect accelerates polymerization by at least one or two orders of magnitude (Kanavarioti and
White, 1987). We model such synthesis as a three-step process: (1) association between primer and
template, (2) template-directed elongation of the primer, and (3) dissociation of the double-stranded
product. In addition, the grouping together of molecules (e.g., using vesicle membranes) is thought
to be important for the evolution of replication enzymes (Szathmiry and Demeter, 1987; Szostak
et al., 2001; Chen et al., 2006; Traulsen and Nowak, 2006). A recent experimental study demon-
strated template-directed synthesis inside model protocells using activated monomers supplied from
the exterior (Mansy et al., 2008). The system we study in this paper is in some ways similar to the
system of nucleic acid sequences in a model protocell.
There have been many investigations of the origin of life, both experimental and theoretical
(Oparin, 1953; Crick, 1968; Orgel, 1968, 1992; Eigen, 1971; Eigen and Schuster, 1982; Dyson, 1982,
1999; Kuppers, 1983; Stein and Anderson, 1984; Farmer et al., 1986; Fontana and Schuster, 1998;
Lifson and Lifson, 1999; de Duve, 2005, 2007). The first step towards life must have been the synthesis
of basic organic building blocks-amino acids, carbohydrates, and nucleotides-in primitive-Earth
conditions (Miller, 1953; Allen and Ponnamperuma, 1967; Miller and Orgel, 1974; Hargreaves et al.,
1977; Rao et al., 1982; Rushdi and Simoneit, 2001; Benner et al., 2002; Ricardo et al., 2004; Benner
and Ricardo, 2005; Wachtershauser, 2007; Powner et al., 2009). After those basic components became
available, mechanisms for storing information and catalyzing chemical reactions must have arisen.
While other genetic polymers may have preceded RNA, it is generally accepted that an "RNA
world" evolved at some point. In this world, RNA acted as both information carrier and enzyme
(Woese, 1967; Crick, 1968; Orgel, 1986;Joyce, 1989, 2002; Ellington and Szostak, 1990; Cech, 1993;
Sievers and von Kiedrowski, 1994; Johnston et al., 2001; Steitz and Moore, 2003; Hughes et al., 2004).
Evidence supporting the RNA world theory comes from several sources, including the discovery
that RNA forms the catalytic core of the ribosome (Nissen et al., 2000) and the discovery of RNA
molecules that catalyze nucleic acid chemistry (Wilson and Szostak, 1999). A particularly noteworthy
RNA molecule, evolved from a ligase ribozyme, catalyzes template-directed RNA polymerization,
demonstrating a step toward a replication enzyme (Bartel and Szostak, 1993; Johnston et al., 2001). In
a recent experiment, Lincoln and Joyce (2009) constructed paired RNA catalysts that can synthesize
copies of each other when supplied with the right chemical precursors. This system resembles the
"hypercycle" of Eigen and Schuster (1977, 1979), a cooperative network of enzymes that may have
been one of the first forms of life. Here, we focus on a relatively early stage of life in which templating
polymers (e.g., nucleic acids) existed but enzymes had not necessarily yet evolved.
One difficulty in the origin of life is the problem of combinatorial complexity. Very short RNA
sequences generally do not have catalytic activity because they are not long enough to fold into
active structures. Short ribozymes, for example, are about 30 bases long (Lee and Suga, 2001; Pan
and Uhlenbeck, 1992). Hence, if (1) a molecule must be relatively long to have enzymatic activity and
(2) most long molecules do not act as enzymes (Carothers and Szostak, 2006), then the probability
that random polymerization will lead to a ribozyme is exceedingly small. One possible resolution
to this problem is to somehow bias the formation of RNA sequences toward active sequences. For
example, catalysis of RNA polymerization by montmorillonite clay appears to promote some lineages
while suppressing others (Miyakawa and Ferris, 2003; Ferris et al., 2004). Such biases can dramatically
reduce the effective size of sequence space. We investigated selection by differential rates of production
("selection before replication") previously (Nowak and Ohtsuki, 2008). However, this mechanism
does not necessarily bias the sequence pool toward active replicators. Another way to increase the
chances of producing ribozymes is to bias the length distribution toward long sequences. Here we
investigate how such a bias might arise.
4.2 The model
4.2.1 Basic setup
We consider "unary" sequences, N'. For example, N3 = NNN, where N represents an arbitrary
monomer (e.g., the ribonucleotide A, C, G, or U). Here we focus on the efficiency of replication
and the equilibrium length distribution, rather than mutation and diversity, so for simplicity we do
not distinguish between different types of monomers. Sequences grow by incorporating activated
monomers, *N, according to the chemical reaction N' + *N -+ Ni+1.
Let x denote the abundance of activated monomers and yi the abundance of sequences of length
i. The dynamics of these quantities are described by the following differential equations:
o
x = A - ax - dx - ax (yi,
i=1
Y1 = ax - (ax + d)y1, (4.1)
gi = axyi_1 - (ax + d)yi, i = 2,3,....
Activated monomers enter the system at the constant rate A. They are deactivated (e.g., by hydrolysis)
at rate a. When a sequence oflength i and an activated monomer meet, the sequence may be extended
to form a new one of length i + 1. Extension occurs at rate axyi. All sequences are removed from
the system at rate d. This system is what we call prelife (Nowak and Ohtsuki, 2008; Manapat et al.,
2009; Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2009).
Now we introduce replication through template-directed synthesis (Figure 4-1). For simplicity,
we first assume that only sequences of a particular length, n, can be templates. (Later, we consider
the more realistic scenario in which all sequences with length between a minimum and maximum
are templates.) Replication occurs when a primer of length k binds to a template so that their ends
are aligned. The primer length, k, might be determined by salt concentrations, temperature, etc.
Template-directed elongation occurs until the primer has been extended to length n. The strands
'N
Prelife
a
5'...N + *N -+5'...NN
*N3'NNNNNNNNN.,. 3'NNNNNNNNN..
Template-directed 5'NNNNN 
p 5NNNNN N
synthesis B 5'NNNNN
3'NNNNNNNNN. D 3'NNNNNNNNN...
S'NNNNNNNNN... 5'NNNNNNNNN..
'NN N ,d
N
5'NNNNNNNNN...
*N
SNNNNN
etc.
Figure 4-1: Non-templated polymerization and template-directed synthesis occur inside a model
system using activated monomers supplied from the exterior. Replication begins when a primer
(of length k) binds to a template (of length n) so that their ends are aligned. Template-directed
elongation occurs until the primer has been extended to a sequence of length n. The pair then
dissociates, yielding the original template and a copy. The two sequences can then begin a new cycle
of replication. Activated monomers can be hydrolyzed, thereby losing activation, and all sequences
are degraded at a fixed rate.
then dissociate. The product sequences can then participate in prelife or replication reactions. For
a given primer length k and template length n, the dynamics of the system are described by the
following system of differential equations:
CO n-1
activated monomers x = A -d ax - ax (i - Ax zi,
i=1 i=k
g1= ax - (ax + d)yi,
gI = axyil - (ax + d)yi, i = 2,3,...,i f k,n,
sequences (single strands)
gk = axyk _1 - (ax + d )yk - Bykyn, (4.2)
gn = axyn_1 - (ax + d)yn - Bykyn + 2Dzn,
2k = Bykyn - Pxzk - dzk,
double strands 2; = px(zi_1 - zi) - dzi, i = k + 1,. .,n -1,
in= f xzn_1 - (D +d)zn.
The abundance of activated monomers is x and the abundance of sequences of length i is yi.
Abundances of sequences other than primers and templates obey the prelife equations (4.1). The
binding of a primer and template to form a reactive complex occurs at rate B. The variables zi,
where k < i < n, denote the abundances of double strands: zk is the abundance of pairs in which
one strand has length k and the other length n (formed after a primer binds to a template), Zk+1 is
the abundance of pairs in which one strand has length k +1 and the other length n (formed after one
elongation step has occurred), and so forth. The parameter P is the template-directed elongation rate.
The double-stranded complex dissociates at rate D. Such dissociation could be induced by thermal
denaturation, which itself may be driven, for instance, by diurnal cycling. When B = 0, (4.2) reduces
to the prelife system (4.1).
4.2.2 Model parameters and model protocells
Although prebiotic parameter values are unknown, several relevant rates have been determined in an
experimental model system. Let us consider a model protocell consisting of a vesicle encapsulating
nucleic acid sequences that replicate by template-directed synthesis (Mansy et al., 2008). In this case,
the rate of input of activated monomers (A) represents the rate of permeation of activated mononu-
cleotides into the protocell. The equilibration half-time for a commonly used reactive monomer
(5'-phosphorimidazolides) across model membranes based on fatty acids is on the order of seconds
to hours, depending on the temperature (Mansy and Szostak, 2008; Mansy et al., 2008). A typical
experimental concentration of activated monomers is on the order of 5-50 mM (Kanavarioti and
White, 1987; Kozlov and Orgel, 2000; Mansy et al., 2008). Thus A would be on the order of 10-3
to 101 M/hr in this system. We assume that monomers generated by prebiotic chemistry have sim-
ilar properties so that the resulting sequences have similar binding, dissociation, and polymerization
rates. For example, we do not consider the consequence of using monomers of different chirality (D-
and L-nucleotides). Although this is a simplification, previous work has demonstrated physical and
chemical mechanisms for obtaining high enantiomeric excess from a racemic mixture (Blackmond,
2004; Klussmann et al., 2006; Viedma et al., 2008)
Inactivation ofphosphorimidazolide monomers during experiments is due to hydrolysis that yields
the nucleotide monophosphate. The half-life of these monomers under template-directed poly-
merization conditions has been measured to be between 7 and 150 hours, depending on reaction
conditions (Kanavarioti and White, 1987). Thus a would be roughly 0.005 to 0.1 hr- 1 .
The presence of a template substantially enhances polymerization rates (Orgel, 2004a). This effect
was measured for activated ribonucleotides (Kanavarioti and White, 1987). In these experiments, the
rate constant of non-templated polymerization was found to be 0.09 M- 1 hr- 1 when considering
3'-5' linkages (0.7 M-1 hr 1 when including formation of 2'-5' linkages). Addition of a template
increased this rate constant to 13 M-1 hr-1 (3'-5' linkages alone) or 14.9 M- 1 hr-1 (2'-5' and 3'-
5' linkages). A similar template effect was found in a study of RNA polymerization catalyzed by
Pb2+ and Zn2+, in which the longest products of non-templated polymerization were trimers, but
templated polymerization yielded products 30-40 bases long (Sawai and Orgel, 1975). More highly
activated chemistries could increase these rate constants. Vogel et al. (2005) observed a rate of 40
M- 1 hr- 1 for templated polymerization, for example. In terms of the parameters of our model,
these experiments suggest that the non-templated polymerization rate a would be on the order of
0.1 to 1 M-1 hr- 1 , and the template-directed elongation rate p would be on the order of 10 to 100
M- 1 hr- 1.
Annealing a primer to a template is generally a fast process compared with the other reactions in
the system. For example, one measurement of the second order rate constant for annealing 20 bases
is around 104 M-1 hr 1 (Gartner et al., 2002). However, this rate depends on the temperature and
the length of the annealing segment and can be very sensitive to buffer conditions, particularly ionic
strength (Eun, 1996). A typical reaction for template-directed synthesis might allow a few minutes for
annealing. Thus, the primer-template binding rate B is likely to be among the highest rate constants
in the model, but its value may lie in a relatively large range. On the other hand, strand dissociation
may be on the order of once per day (diurnal thermocycling), suggesting a value of D ~ 0.04 hr-1 ,
although faster cycling could occur in thermal convection cells (Krishnan et al., 2002).
4.2.3 Model assumptions
For the purposes of simulation, it is useful to transform the infinite system (4.2) into a finite system.
To do this, we introduce a new variable w,
00
w =T i, (4.3)
i=n+1
representing the total abundance of all sequences of length greater than n. Then
00
w=( gi
i=n+1
= L (axy;i - (ax + d)y;) (4.4)
i-n+1
axyn - dw.
The complete system (4.2) can then be simulated with 2n - k + 3 differential equations. Extensive
numerical simulations suggest that the equilibrium of (4.2) is globally stable.
In our model, the lengths of primers and templates are constrained in two ways. First, for the sake
of analytic tractability, we assume that only sequences of a particular length, k, can act as primers.
This simplification is justified because (1) a primer has a minimum length required for annealing,
which depends on the environmental conditions, and (2) long primers are relatively rare (i.e., their
abundance decreases exponentially with length in prelife; see below). We relaxed this assumption in
numerical simulations in which sequences of many lengths acted as primers and obtained qualitatively
similar results. Second, we assume that only sequences with lengths in a certain range can act as
templates. We consider two versions of this assumption. We begin by doing our calculations for the
simplified scenario of a single template length. However, our main focus is the realistic scenario in
which templates have lengths in some range. The minimum length of a template is determined by
the annealing length. For example, the annealing length-and thus the minimum possible primer
length-is approximately 3 when the system is at less than 10 degrees C. The maximum length is
determined by the relative rates of template-directed polymerization and of thermocycling-induced
strand dissociation. If template-directed polymerization proceeds at one base per hour (Kanavarioti
and White, 1987; Vogel et al., 2005), and thermocycling results in one dissociation event per day, then
a typical template's length will be somewhere between 20 and 30 bases. For sequences with lengths
in the permissible range for templates, replication is generally completed before strands dissociate.
By studying unary sequences, we have ignored the effects of complementary base pairing. How-
ever, we can interpret our model in another way. Suppose we have a binary alphabet for our se-
quences, so a sequence is a string of O's and 1's. We consider a particular polymerization lineage. For
example, 0 -* 01 -+ 011 -* 0110 - - - . . We then let xi denote the sum of the abundance of the
sequence of length i in this lineage and the abundance of its complement. The zi's are interpreted
analogously. In this way, the results of our analysis below also describe the effect that replication with
complementary base pairing has on the length distribution of sequences in a particular lineage.
4.3 Templates of a single length: numerical simulations
Figure 4-2(a) shows the prelife dynamics of sequences of lengths 1 to 30. There is no template-
directed synthesis. All initial abundances are zero. At t = 0, activated monomers begin to enter
the system. Some are hydrolyzed to form sequences of length 1. Longer and longer sequences are
built as activated monomers are appended to the ends of existing sequences. At equilibrium, longer
sequences are exponentially less common than shorter sequences.
Figure 4-2(b) shows the corresponding dynamics when sequences of length 30 (red) replicate
using length-3 primers (dark blue). As before, all abundances are initially zero. Prelife generates
primers and templates. In this example, the parameter values allow only slow replication, corre-
sponding to a scenario in which template-directed polymerization is not much more efficient than
non-templated polymerization. Many templates get trapped in the double-stranded state, and at
equilibrium sequences of length 30 are less abundant than they are in the absence of replication.
In contrast, for Figure 4-2(c), the template-directed elongation rate P has been increased by an
order of magnitude. Now the relative rate of template-directed to non-templated polymerization is
in the range of experimentally observed values for an RNA-based system (Kanavarioti and White,
1987). At t ~ 10, the abundance of templates begins to increase sharply and the abundance of primers
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Figure 4-2: (a) Dynamics of sequences up to length 30 without replication. The abundance of length-
3 sequences is in dark blue, and the abundance of length-30 sequences is in red. The single-strand
elongation rate a is 10, the death rate d is 0.1, and all other constants are 1. Initial abundances are all
zero. (b) The corresponding dynamics when sequences of length 30 (red) replicate using length-3
primers (dark blue). The primer-template binding rate B is 100; the double-strand dissociation rate
D is 1; and the template-directed elongation rate p is 53.4. The basic reproductive ratio of length-30
sequenences, R30 , is 0.50, consistent with the fact that replication is not efficient enough to boost the
abundance of length-30 sequences beyond its pre-replication value. (c) The dynamics when p has
been increased to 455. Now R30 = 5.00, and the equilibrium abundance of length-30 sequences is
much greater than (almost ten times) its pre-replication value.
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Figure 4-3: Equilibrium abundances of sequences of lengths 1 to 40 as functions of the primer-
template binding rate, B. Sequences of length 30 (red) replicate using length-3 primers (dark blue).
The broken line indicates where the basic reproductive ratio of length-30 sequences, R 30, equals 1
and the red arrow where the equilibrium abundance is most sensitive to changes in B. The single-
strand elongation rate a is 10; the death rate d is 0.1; the double-strand dissociation rate D is 1; the
template-directed elongation rate P is 500; and all other constants are 1.
begins to decrease. A chain reaction has started: the more templates there are, the more primers are
consumed in replication reactions. At equilibrium, the abundance of length-30 sequences is almost
ten times its prelife value.
Figure 4-3 shows the equilibrium abundances of sequences of lengths 1 to 40, as functions of the
primer-template binding rate B, when sequences of length 30 (red) replicate using length-3 primers
(dark blue). As B varies, all other parameters are held constant. For small values of B, the equilibrium
abundance of length-30 sequences remains close to its prelife value. Since primer-template binding
is weak, double strands are slow to form and replication does not lead to a significant increase in the
abundance of templates. For large values of B, the equilibrium abundance of templates is almost an
order of magnitude greater than it is when B is 0. A high binding rate means that templates and
primers associate rapidly to form double strands. Other factors, such as the rate at which double
strands dissociate and the availability of primer and template precursors, then become rate-limiting.
This is the reason for the saturation we observe at high B. As B increases through intermediate
values, there is a dramatic increase in the equilibrium abundance of templates. The abundance is
most sensitive to changes in B when B = 20.89.
We observe this transition from prelife to life, which is characterized by a high abundance of long
replicating sequences, when other parameters are varied as well. For instance, as Figure 4-2 suggests,
when P increases as all other parameters are kept constant, there is a critical range during which
the equilibrium abundance of templates increases most rapidly. The same is true as D is increased.
For fixed primer length k and template length n, the model parameter space-A, a, a, d, B, D, and
p take values in [0, oo) 7-consists of two regions. When the model parameters are in one region,
the equilibrium structure is almost the same as for prelife. In the other region, template-directed
polymerization dominates. The two regions are separated by a critical surface. As the parameters
approach and cross this surface, there is a transition from prelife to life.
4.4 The critical surface
4.4.1 Calculation of the surface
Consider the following scenario. We start with the system (4.2), but the primer-template binding
rate is zero and so no replication is possible. The system could be in a high temperature environment,
for example. Sequence abundances settle to their prelife equilibrium values. Now the system's
environment cools, so binding of primers and templates can occur and replication begins. If the
reaction rates cause templates to be more abundant at the new equilibrium than they were before
replication was possible, then we are "above" the critical surface. For this to happen, the abundance
of templates must increase from its prelife equilibrium value. If this increase is insignificant, then we
are "below" the surface. Although replication is possible, the system essentially remains very close to
its prelife equilibrium. Hence, we will find the critical surface by examining how the abundance of
templates deviates from prelife equilibrium after double-strand formation becomes possible.
We assume that the template-directed elongation rate, P, is large enough to produce at least some
complete copies before thermocycling results in strand dissociation. (This requirement motivated our
restrictions on possible template length.) In this case, there is a separation of time scales, and we can
make the steady-state assumption that 2; = 0 for all i. Intuitively, if the elongation reactions are very
fast, then the zi adjust very quickly to the slower changes in x and the yj.
At steady-state, we have
Zk - Bykyn
zk+1 = X zk, I = 2,..., n - k - 1, (4.5)px+d'
zn=D +d zn_1.
It follows that
B (f/x n~k
Zn = d nx ykyn. (4.6)
D+d \jpx+d,/Y) . 46
Equation (4.6) describes the relationship among the abundances x, yk, Yn, and zn at steady-state. The
dynamical change of the template abundance is given by
gn = axyn-1 - (ax + d)yn - Bykyn + 2Dzn. (4.7)
We evaluate (4.7) when X, Yk, Yn-1, and Yn are at their prelife equilibrium values. Longer sequences
are exponentially less common than shorter sequences at prelife equilibrium, which is given by
d a
x 2 a [ (a +d)2+4xA (a +(d)
a ( ax* '
a ax*+d '
(A * denotes a quantity's prelife equilibrium value.) Thus, for large n we can make the approximation
axy*_1 ~ 0. After substituting (4.6), we find that the initial growth of templates at prelife equilibrium
is
yn ~ -ax* - d + 2D By - By yn. (4.9)D +d px* + d
The first two terms in brackets give the removal rate and the third and fourth terms the "production,"
or replication, rate. The templates' abundance will increase significantly when the production terms
are larger than the removal terms. Let
Rn =22 - 11 By*. (4.10)
ax*+d D+d Px*+d k
If Rn > 1, the production terms are larger than the removal terms, and the abundance of templates
grows significantly. If Rn < 1, the removal terms are larger than the production terms, and the
abundance of templates remains low, close to its prelife value. Thus the critical surface is Rn = 1.
Note that we obtain a different surface for different values of the primer length k and the template
length n.
Figure 4-2 shows how the abundance of sequences of length 30 (red) evolves in time for different
parameter values. Figure 4-2(a) shows the progression towards prelife equilibrium. For Figure 4-
2(b), sequences of length 30 replicate. Their equilibrium abundance is less than it is in prelife. This is
expected since R 30 = 0.50, so the parameters that produce the dynamics lie below the critical surface.
On the other hand, for Figure 4-2(c), R30 = 5.00. The parameters are far above the critical surface,
and the equilibrium abundance of templates is almost ten times its prelife value.
Figure 4-3 shows the equilibrium abundance of length-30 templates, in red, as a function of the
primer-template binding rate B. The broken vertical line is the critical boundary R30 = 1. The
transition from low abundance to high abundance occurs as this boundary is crossed. The red arrow
indicates the point at which the equilibrium abundance of templates is changing fastest as a function
of B.
We can interpret Rn as a basic reproductive ratio (Anderson and May, 1979; May and Ander-
son, 1979; Nowak and May, 2000; Nowak, 2006). At prelife equilibrium, the average lifetime of a
sequence is 1/(ax* + d). Once replication begins, the rate at which a template is copied is
2D- 1 By (4.11)D + d (Px* + d) I k
By multiplying this rate with the average lifetime, we obtain the basic reproductive ratio given by
(4.10). Hence Rn is the expected number of templates that arise as copies of a single template, during
its lifetime, at the onset of replication. Rn is an increasing, linear function of B-as more double
strands are formed, more copies of the template are produced-and an increasing, saturating function
of D (the dissociation rate) and p (the template-directed polymerization rate).
4.4.2 The discriminant
Let
2D px* n-k
A = D x* - 1. (4.12)D+d Px* +d
Observe that if A < 0, then Rn < 0. In particular, if A < 0, then Rn will never be greater than 1,
regardless of how large B is. We call A the "discriminant." The sign of the discriminant indicates
whether selection of the templates is possible, regardless of the value of B.
We can write the condition A < 0 as
(n - k) log < log D d). (4.13)(Px* + d) 2D
If we take d to be very small, then we can make the approximation
(n-k)lg px* d(n - k) log ~ -(n - k) . (4.14)
Hence we can rewrite (4.13) as
n-k> log 2D (4.15)
dx*  D + d
This says that if the average polymerization time (the time it takes to extend a primer to a full copy of
the template) is too long, then the templates can never be selected. This is reminiscent of the "error
threshold" of quasispecies theory if we rewrite the condition as
1 > C (4.16)
Px* n - k'
where
C = - log (D (4.17)
d (D +d
If the average time it takes to add one base (along the template) is greater than the inverse of the
template length, then selection for the template is impossible, regardless of how fast double strands
are formed. This limit leads naturally to our main scenario, in which the upper limit of template
length is determined by the number of monomers that can be added before the next thermocycle.
4.5 Templates of many lengths
4.5.1 Reversals
For simplicity, we formulated the system (4.2) so that only sequences of length n can be templates,
but we can extend the model so that all sequences with lengths in a certain range can replicate.
We assume that the binding (B), dissociation (D), and elongation (P) rates are independent of a
template's length, and we continue to assume that primers have length k. Rn decreases as n increases
because of the [px*/(fx* + d)]n-k term in (4.10). This means shorter templates have larger basic
reproductive ratios than longer templates. Fewer monomers need to be polymerized to make a copy
of a shorter template. Hence, the probability that a double-stranded intermediate is degraded during
the replication process is smaller for shorter sequences.
Suppose all sequences with lengths between ni and n2 can be templates. If ni < n < n2 , then a
sequence of length n can arise in one of two ways: (1) it can be created as a direct copy of an already-
existing sequence of length n (replication), or (2) it can be formed when a monomer is appended
to the end of a sequence of length n - 1 (prelife extension). This coupling of templates by prelife
extension can result in "reversals" in the length distribution in the sense that slower replicating, longer
sequences become more abundant than faster replicating, shorter sequences (Manapat et al., 2009).
Figure 4-4 shows that the prelife equilibrium structure remains intact when B is small. In Figure
4-4(a), ni = 25 and n2 = 30. In Figure 4-4(b), ni = 20 and n2 = 30. In Figure 4-4(c), ni = 4
and n2 = 30. Longer sequences are less abundant than shorter ones. This is expected since shorter
sequences have larger basic reproductive ratios than longer sequences. As B increases, Ri increases
for each i between ni and n2. But it remains the case that Ri > Rj if i < j. When B is sufficiently
large, however, the equilibrium abundance of length-j templates can be higher than that of length-i
templates. When all templates are being replicated quickly, longer templates benefit from the fact
shorter templates can be extended into longer ones by prelife polymerization. Hence we obtain
reversals in equilibrium abundances such as the ones between B = 1 and B = 2 in Figures 4-4(a) and
4-4(b) and B = 10 and B = 11 in Figure 4-4(c).
E E
1-2 -2
10 10 10 10 10 10 10(a) Primer-template binding rate, B (b) Primer-template binding rate, B
10 -1 R 1 1 II11=
1-2 
-
10 A
10o 10 110 210 3 10 4
(C) Primer-template binding rate, B
Figure 4-4: (a) Equilibrium abundances of sequences of lengths 1 to 40 as functions of the primer-
template binding rate, B. Sequences of lengths 25 to 30 (red) replicate using length-3 primers (dark
blue). The broken red line is where the chain amplification ratio RA equals 1. In this case, the chain
amplification ratio is the number of "second-generation" sequences of length 30 obtained from a
single "first-generation" sequence of length 25. The broken magenta line is where the cumulative
basic reproductive ratio, Rc, equals 1. The cumulative basic reproductive ratio is the total number of
offspring produced by a single sequence of length 25 over its lifetime, even as it is extended to form
longer sequences. The broken black line is where the basic reproductive ratios of sequence of length
25 to 30 are all (approximately) equal to 1. The red arrow indicates where the equilibrium abundance
of length-30 templates is most sensitive to changes in B. The rate constants are as in Figure 4-3. (b)
The same abundances when sequences of lengths 20 to 30 replicate. The broken black lines are where
the basic reproductive ratios of sequences of length 20 and 30 equal 1. In both Figure 4-4(a) and
4-4(b), the equilibrium abundance of length-30 templates is increasing fastest close to where RA = 1.(c) The abundances when sequencs of length 4 to 30 replicate: all sequences longer than the primer,
up to the maximum length of 30, are templates. Here Rc = 1 is a better approximation of where the
abundance of the longest templates is increasing most rapidly.
4.5.2 Subcritical life
When there are multiple templates linked together by prelife extension, we observe a phenomenon
that we call "subcritical life." Subcritical life is characterized by the existence of templates with
Rn < 1 that nevertheless attain equilibrium abundances significantly greater than in prelife. In other
words, there are templates for which the derivative of their equilibrium abundance, as a function of
the binding rate B, is maximized at a value of B such that Rn < 1. Let gi (B) denote the equilibrium
abundance of templates of length i as a function of B (all other parameters are held constant).
In Figure 4-3, only sequences of length 30 replicate, and the derivative a93 0/B is maximized
when B = 20.89 and R30 = 1.06. In Figure 4-4(a), sequences of lengths 25 to 30 replicate. For
large enough values of B, sequences of length 30 are most abundant. The derivative Dg30 /B is now
maximized when B = 6.92 and R 30 = 0.35. In Figure 4-4(b), sequences of length 20 to 30 replicate,
and a930 /aB is largest when B = 4.50 and R30 = 0.23.
Subcritical life has two interesting features. First, the value of B necessary to induce the transition
from prelife to life decreases as the length of the chain of consecutive templates increases. Hence it is
easier to select templates when there is a greater range of template lengths. For example, when there
are six templates in the chain, the transition is steepest when B = 6.92 (Figure 4-4(a)) . When there
are eleven templates in the chain, the transition is steepest when B = 4.50 (Figure 4-4(b)) . Second,
the transition occurs at a value of B such that Rn < 1 not just for the template of maximal length but
in fact for templates of all lengths in the chain. Subcritical life occurs because the abundance of the
longest template is amplified not only by the replication of those sequences but also by the replication
(and subsequent extension) of upstream sequences. Thus prelife can "jump-start" life.
We can now ask for a general condition that predicts the onset of subcritical life. When there
are templates ofjust one length, this condition should reduce to Rn = 1. When sequences of many
lengths can be templates, the condition should reflect the effects of prelife extension appropriately.
We propose two candidates: the chain amplification ratio and the cumulative basic reproductive ratio.
4.5.3 The chain amplification ratio
Our first candidate is a quantity that reflects whether long sequences are amplified relative to short
sequences. We begin with several definitions. A first-generation sequence of length n is one that is
made by a prelife reaction (i.e., not by the copying of another sequence of length n). For example, a
sequence that is obtained by extending one of length n - 1 is a first-generation sequence. A second-
generation sequence is one that is a direct copy of a first-generation sequence. Consider a replicating
sequence of length n. The basic reproductive ratio, Rn, is the expected number of second-generation
sequences of length n that are obtained from a single sequence of length n at the onset of replication.
Suppose sequences of length n and n + 1 replicate. What is the expected number of second-
generation sequences of length n + 1 that are obtained from a single sequence of length n (at the
onset of replication)? We denote this quantity by Rn,n+1 and compute it as follows. Consider the
initial sequence of length n. It will undergo one of three processes. (1) It can replicate at rate
~ 2D x* n-k 1
rn= - 1J By'. (4.18)
D +d Px* + d-
Each of the two resulting sequences will then yield Rn,n+1 second-generation sequences of length
n + 1. (2) It can be lost through removal at rate d, yielding no sequences of length n + 1. Or (3) it
can be extended to form a sequence of length n + 1 at rate ax*. From the extended sequence, we
eventually obtain Rn+1 second-generation sequences of length n. The probability of each of these
events is proportional to the corresponding rate constant. Thus,
Rn,n+ - " 2Rnn+1 + d 0+ ax* Rn+1 (4.19)
rn+d+ax* rn+d+ax* rn+d+ax*
from which we obtain
ax*-Rn,n+1 = d +  - rn Rn+1. (4.20)
Since Rn = rn /(d + ax*), we can rewrite this as
Rn,n+ = ax* 1 1  Rn+1. (4.21)
Suppose now that sequences of length ni to n2 replicate. We define the chain amplification ratio,
which we denote by RA, to be the expected number of second-generation sequences of length n2
obtained from a single sequence of length n1 . If RA is greater than one, short sequences lead to more
and more copies of long sequences. A generalization of (4.21) yields
RA =( a* )n2-ni (n2-1 1 n'(.2
ax* + d r_ 1 - R;
Figure 4-5(a) gives an example of the calculation of RA when sequences of length 3 and 4 replicate.
We start with a single template of length 3. This sequence replicates twice. One of the copies
replicates again but then is lost (due to removal). There are three remaining sequences of length 3,
each of which is extended to form a sequence of length 4. Thus there are three first-generation
sequences of length 4. The offspring of these sequences-of which there are five-form the second
generation. Hence RA = 5 in this example, if the numbers are interpreted as averages.
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Figure 4-5: Suppose sequences of length nj to n2 replicate and that a sequence of length i can be
extended to form a sequence of length i + 1. (a) The chain amplification ratio RA is the number
of second generation templates of length nl2 obtained from a single template of length nj. "Second
generation" means that the sequence has exactly one other sequence of length n2 in its production
lineage. Here n1 = 3, n2 = 4, and RA =5, if the numbers are interpreted as averages. (b) The
cumulative basic reproductive ratio RC is the number of direct offspring of a sequence even as it is
extenided to form longer sequences. Again n1 3 and n2 = 4. The length 3 sequence is copied
twice before being extended. The new length 4 sequence is copied three times before being extended.
Thus RC = 5, again if the numbers are interpreted as averages.
4.5.4 The cumulative basic reproductive ratio
Our second candidate is a quantity that reflects the number of copies made from a particular template
throughout its entire lifetime in the system, even as it undergoes non-templated polymerization. We
remain in the situation in which sequences of length nj to nl2 replicate. Suppose we tag a particular
sequence of length nj just as replication begins. This is analogous to radioactive labeling of the 5' end
of an RNA sequence. Since extension occurs at the 3' end, the tag is preserved as the sequence is
extended, but copies of the RNA sequence do not have the tag. We can ask how many direct copies
are made of the tagged sequence, even as it is extended to form longer and longer sequences. We
call this quantity the cumulative basic reproductive ratio and denote it by Rc.
Consider first the case in which there are templates of just two lengths, so n2 = n1 + 1. The
initial sequence of length n1 will produce Rni direct copies before it is lost. When a sequence is
lost, it is either removed completely, with probability d/ (d + ax*), or extended by non-templated
polymerization, with probability ax* / (d +I- ax*). If it is extended, an additional Rn, direct copies are
made of the longer sequence. Hence,
Rc =Rn,+ (ax*d Rnj 1 - (4.23)
(ax* NNN
Generalizing to arbitrary n2 > n1 , we have
(ax* '\( x* 2 (ax* "-
RC = Rn, + a Rn1+1 + a 2Rn1+2 + + ax*±n) Rn2. (4.24)(ax* +d) (ax* + d) (ax* + d)
Figure 4-5(b) gives an example of the calculation of Rc when sequences of lengths 3 to 4 are templates.
We start with a template of length 3. Two copies of this length three sequence are produced. The
tagged sequence is then extended, and three copies are made of the extension. In total, the sequence
is copied five times, so Rc = 5, if the numbers denote averages.
In Figures 4-4, the broken red line indicates where RA = 1 and the broken magenta line where
Rc = 1. The red arrow indicates where the abundance of the longest templates is increasing fastest.
We see that subcritical life begins close to RA 1 and Rc = 1. Thus, these quantities can be used to
predict when the transition to subcritical life occurs. However, an analytical justification of this fact
appears to be difficult.
4.6 The analogy with infection dynamics
The equations of our model suggest that life, characterized by highly abundant long sequences, can
be viewed as an infection of prelife. Templates infect primers by turning them into other templates.
But a primer can also be extended, by prelife, to form a template. This "spontaneous generation
of infection" results in an equilibrium population structure that is much different from the structure
when there is no "mutation" from uninfected hosts to infected hosts.
Bonhoeffer and Nowak (1994) study the following scenario. There are n types of infection,
linearly ordered so that a host infected with type i can, by mutation of the pathogen, become a host
infected by type i + 1. Pathogen i has basic reproductive ratio Ri. Let w* denote the equilibrium
abundance of hosts infected by type i. They find that the equilibrium population is characterized as
follows. If Ri < 1 for all i, then w* = 0 for all i. Suppose, on the other hand, that Rj > 1 for at
least one j. Then w* > 0 for all i > io and wJ = 0 for all j < io, where io is such that Ri, > Rk for
all k # io. In other words, if at least one of the pathogens has a basic reproductive ratio greater than
one, then it is precisely the types that are downstream of the one with the highest basic reproductive
ratio that survive at equilibrium.
Suppose now that there is spontaneous generation of infection. This means that uninfected hosts
can spontaneously acquire an infection by type 1 (without having to come into contact with a host
infected by type 1). It no longer makes sense to ask when the all-zeros equilibrium is stable. Since
there is mutation from uninfected hosts , w7 > 0 for all i. We can, however, ask the following.
Suppose the transmissibility of all the pathogens is zero. There is a natural equilibrium in which
w* > 0, for all i, due to mutation. How large do the transmissibilities have to be for the w to be
much greater than they are in the pre-transmission equilibrium?
We can frame this question in the context of our model (4.2). The system starts at prelife equi-
librium. When template-directed synthesis becomes possible, templates can "infect" primers. What
must be true of the parameters for the abundance of templates to increase significantly from the initial
prelife values? We find that RA = 1 and Rc = 1 are the crucial criteria in this case.
4.7 Conclusion
We have introduced a model of template-directed synthesis. Activated monomers enter the system
and polymerize in a template-independent (slow) or template-dependent (fast) mechanism. For the
purpose of analyzing this model, we have greatly simplified the scenario by neglecting the possibility
of template-directed ligation (James and Ellington, 1997; Gao and Orgel, 2000), of a primer binding
in the middle of a template to produce a shorter sequence, and of the breaking up of sequences to
produce shorter sequences. Our assumptions correspond to an experimental scenario in which a
defined primer sequence is used, activated polymers are scarce relative to activated monomers, and
hydrolysis of the nucleic acid is relatively slow (Mansy et al., 2008). We also neglected the role of
sequence diversity in order to focus on the length distribution.
We found that for some values of the kinetic rate constants, the equilibrium abundance of long
templates remains low. This corresponds to a system with poor templating ability, where 3 is relatively
low compared to a. For others, the equilibrium shifts rapidly toward long templates. A system with
good templating ability, like RNA, would be characterized by a relatively large P. This shift in
length distribution could be particularly important during the origin of life since a bias toward long
sequences could increase the frequency of ribozymes in a protocell. We computed the critical surface
in parameter space separating these two regions. In the case of a single template length, the surface
is precisely the locus of points where the basic reproductive ratio equals one.
If there is a chain of templates, each being extended by non-templated polymerization into the
next, long sequences can dominate even before the critical surface is reached. Even if each template is
unviable on its own (i.e., has an Rn less than one), the equilibrium abundance of the longest templates
in the chain can still be much larger than the equilibrium abundance of those sequences in prelife.
This is not the result of Darwinian selection-all the sequences have basic reproductive ratios less than
one and the differences in replication rate are minimal-but rather an effect of the interplay between
chemical polymerization and replication. We have proposed two quantities, the chain amplification
ratio and the cumulative basic reproductive ratio. These quantities are near one when the transition
from low to high abundance occurs for the longest templates. Prelife combines replication potentials:
it links weak replicators together to jump-start life.
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Chapter 5
Emergence of complex, stable, and diverse sequences in the RNA world
Julien Derr, Michael L. Manapat, Sudha Rajamani, Kevin Leu,
IsaacJoseph, Martin A. Nowak, and Irene A. Chen
Abstract The origin of life must have been preceded by a period during which the complexity and
information content of nucleic acid polymers increased to a sufficiently high level that an "RNA
world," with RNA sequences serving as both functionally active molecules and repositories of ge-
netic information, became possible. Ribozymes and aptamers are highly complex sequences, where
a sequence's "complexity" is related to its information-theoretic entropy, and the vast majority of
sequences are of moderate to high complexity. Thus, a prebiotic chemical system without mech-
anisms for searching efficiently through complex "sequence space" will not produce the functional
molecules that were essential to the emergence of life. RNA biochemistry is characterized by large
differences in synthetic yield, reactivity to polymerization, and degradation rate, and these properties
are believed to result in pools of highly homogeneous, low complexity sequences (Joyce, 1987). Was
the emergence of functionally active RNA sequences then just a matter of luck, or does the chemistry
of RNA have a process that can select for and enhance complexity? In this paper, we find that the
latter is the case. Using simulations of prebiotic chemical systems, we show that template-directed
ligation and the mass-action effect of sequence concatenation increase the average complexity and
population diversity in pools of RNA molecules. We verify these theoretical results with experiments
showing that ligation does enhance complexity in real RNA systems. We also find a correlation be-
tween predicted RNA folding energy and complexity, demonstrating the functional importance of
this measure. These results contrast with previous assumptions that fine-tuning of the system is the
only way to achieve high complexity. Our work shows that the chemical mechanisms involved in
nucleic acid polymerization and oligomerization predispose the RNA world towards a diverse pool of
complex, energetically stable sequences, setting the stage for the appearance of catalytic activity prior
to the onset of natural selection.
5.1 Introduction
The biology of modern organisms is based on RNA, DNA, and proteins, but life as we know it is
believed to have been preceded by a stage in which RNA molecules acted both as chemical catalysts
and as the carriers of genetic information. This period is known as "the RNA world" (Woese et al.,
1966; Crick, 1968; Orgel, 1968). Evidence for the RNA world includes the similarity of ancient
chemical cofactors to RNA and the discovery that the catalytic core of the ribosome is composed
of RNA (Orgel, 2004b). Possible pathways for the prebiotic synthesis of the components of RNA
and the polymerization of those ribosomal subunits have been reported by several groups (Miyakawa
et al., 2002; Orgel, 2004b; Powner et al., 2009; Rajamani et al., 2010).
One major outstanding problem is to determine how ribozymes first emerged from pools of RNA
sequences that were lacking both in diversity and in information content (Joyce, 1987). Prebiotic
polymerization is believed to have limited the scope of the search through "sequence space" in two
ways. First, RNA monomers have different abundances because they are synthesized and degraded
by different pathways. For example, a concentrated eutectic phase solution of ammonium cyanide
yields significantly more adenine than guanine, uracil, and cytosine (roughly one or more orders of
magnitude) (Miyakawa et al., 2002). Degradation affects the nucleobases differently, with cytosine
being particularly susceptible to spontaneous deamination (Levy and Miller, 1998). The abundances
of nucleobases detected in meteorites also vary by one or more orders of magnitude (Stoks and
Schwartz, 1979, 1981; Shimoyama et al., 1990; Glavin and Bada, 2004). Second, the rate at which
monomers are polyermized can differ among the mononucleotides by an order of magnitude (Sawai
and Orgel, 1975; Kawamura and Ferris, 1999; Miyakawa et al., 2002; Rajamani et al., 2010). In
one study, this bias led to a severe reduction in polymer diversity, as only 4 out of the 512 possible
sequences were formed in detectable amounts (Miyakawa et al., 2002). Both types of bias reduce the
diversity and the internal complexity of the sequences generated, restricting the areas of sequence
space that are explored as well as the information-theoretic content of each sequence. While fine-
tuning the conditions-for example, by adjusting monomer ratios to counteract reduced reactivity
or limiting UV irradiation to attain an appropriate monomer ratio (Johnston et al., 2001; Muller,
2006; Powner et al., 2009)-could potentially overcome these biases, such finely-tuned conditions
are not generic. Thus, we seek robust mechanisms that can lead to the spontaneous emergence of
complexity in RNA pools undergoing prebiotic reactions (ligation, both with and without templates,
and polymerization) without special conditions. We find that the mass-action effect of concatenation
together with template-directed ligation are the necessary processes.
In templated-directed ligation, oligonucleotides act as templates for the joining of adjacent com-
plementary fragments, accelerating the formation of bonds between the fragments (Li and Liu, 2004).
Template-directed ligation appears to be a general phenomenon, occurring with peptides, small
molecules, and nucleic acids (Naylor and Gilham, 1966; Tjivikua et al., 1990; Lee et al., 1996).
Ligation is thought to be an important mechanism for prebiotic synthesis because fewer reactions are
required to assemble a given sequence compared to monomer polymerization, and ligation may be
relatively robust to the presence of non-natural enantiomers (James and Ellington, 1999). Interest-
ingly, template-directed ligation of oligonucleotides appears to be relatively unbiased compared to
monomer polymerization, permitting the incorporation of nucleotides that are effectively unreactive
as monomers (Ninio and Orgel, 1978).
5.2 Complexity and diversity
We argue that ligation, both with and without templates, is a robust mechanism for increasing se-
quence complexity. To measure complexity, we use a generalization of the Shannon entropy (Shan-
non, 1948). For a sequence s, we define the Shannon k-entropy of s, Hk(s), by
Hk(S) = - 0pilog2(Pi),
where i ranges over all subsequences of s of length k and pi is the probability that a random subse-
quence of s of length k is identical to i. Intuitively, Hk measures the internal heterogeneity of the
sequence at the scale of length k. Hk is zero when all subsequences are identical, and Hk attains
its maximum value Hmax when all 2 k possible subsequences appear equally often in s. Because the
maximum possible Shannon entropy grows with sequence length, we will define the "complexity"
of a sequence Ck to be the ratio of Hk to the maximum possible Shannon entropy for sequences of
that length (Ck = Hk/Hax). Ck is the appropriate measure in this context for two reasons.
First, evidence strongly suggests that Ck is highly correlated with functionality. We calculated
the complexity of known ribozymes and aptamers and found that they have high Ck (Figure 1(a)) .
Furthermore, we computed the minimized folding energy (Em) for a large sample of RNA sequences
(Figure 5-1(b)). The folding energies are indeed correlated with Ck, for most values of k, and the
Ck collectively explained 61% of the variance in Em according to a principal components analysis.
There is a noticeable paucity of energetically stable, low complexity sequences, suggesting that high
complexity might be a prerequisite for a stable secondary structure.
Second, high complexity characterizes the vast majority of sequence space. The number of
unique sequences varies approximately exponentially with the complexity (Figure 5-1(a)) . Biases
in monomer composition and reactivity decrease the average Ck and thus restrict the exploration
of sequence space. For example, a 10-fold bias in monomer abundance decreases the average Ck
from 0.94 to 0.43, a substantial difference given the exponential dependence (see the supplementary
information). Any search through sequence space for which the average sequence complexity Ck is
low is therefore bound to omit the vast majority of sequences, dramatically lowering the probability
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Figure 5-1: Sequence complexity, sequence space, and RNA folding energy. (a) Scatter plot of
the complexity Ck (measured with k = 4) of unique RNA sequences, computed from all possible
sequences of length 12 to 18 (open circles) and by random sampling of 109 sequences among all pos-
sible sequences of length 50 (red dots). The dotted green lines correspond to C4 of natural ribozymes
(Ellington, 2010) with mean and standard deviation shown in green. (b) Ck vs. RNA folding energy
(black dots) predicted by Vienna RNA's RNAfold package for 2,500, 000 sequences of length 50. To
minimize effects from GC-content, we restricted the sampling to sequences whose GC content is
between 4 0% and 60%. To avoid sampling artifacts, sequences were binned according to complexity
(5 bins), and an equal number of sequences were analyzed from each bin. The mean and standard
deviations for each bin are shown in red.
(b)
that the search will discover a functionally active molecule.
To quantify sequence diversity directly, we measure the population-level entropy D of a pool of
molecules:
N
D = - ni og 2 (ni),
i=1
where i ranges over all sequences in the pool, N is the total number of distinct sequences, and ni is
the fraction of sequences in the pool that consist of copies of i. D is zero if all molecules are identical,
and D is maximized when molecules are distributed uniformly through sequence space. While Ck is a
measure of internal complexity and D a measure of population-wide diversity, Ck is a good proxy for
D: the average Ck gives us a rough indication of how much of sequence space the search is exploring,
a fact we later demonstrate empirically (see Figure 2(c))
5.3 Results
To understand the effect the different chemical reactions have on the complexity and diversity, we
simulated a population of RNA molecules undergoing concatenation, template-directed ligation, and
hydrolysis. During concatenation, the 5' end of one monomer (or polymer) reacts with the 3' end
of another monomer (or polymer) with rate constant kco. This process first polymerizes monomers
into oligonucleotides. Template-directed ligation can occur when two oligonucleotides anneal adja-
cent to one another on a template sequence, leading to the joining of the two oligonucleotides with
rate constant kuig. We assume that three or more adjacent Watson-Crick base-pairs are required for
annealing (Sievers and von Kiedrowski, 1994; James and Ellington, 1997; Sawai et al., 1997; Sawai
and Wada, 2000). Template-directed ligation is particularly interesting because it can potentially affect
short-range correlations in the system. The templating effect can be quite large, with kig/kcon ~ 10 4
to 107 M-1, depending on the activation chemistry (see the supplementary information) (Kanavarioti
and White, 1987; Sievers and von Kiedrowski, 1994; Rohatgi et al., 1996). Hydrolysis of phospho-
diester bonds, also known to be an important process for RNA molecules, occurs in our simulations
at a constant rate per bond (kh). The concentration of nucleotides in the system, co, also plays an
important role. The dimensionless ratio rcon = kconco/kh controls the relative strength of concatena-
tion and hydrolysis, and the ratio rug = kuigco /kcon controls the relative strength of template-directed
ligation and concatenation. Realistically, co is in the millimolar range and rcon is roughly between 1
and 10.
We assume that activation chemistry is not rate-limiting, similar to experimental implementations.
For simplicity, we also use a two-base system, which has been proposed as a progenitor of the 4-base
system and which does not preclude catalytic function (Wachtershauser, 1988; Levy and Miller, 1998;
Reader andJoyce, 2002). In terms of chemical and informational properties, a four-base system can
be thought of as a binary system in some respects (e.g., purines and pyrimidines).
Based on these chemical reactions, we implemented a stochastic simulation of a small reactor (e.g.,
a protocell) and a deterministic simulation mimicking a very large reactor. These simulations are
generalizations of the recently introduced "prelife" framework (Nowak and Ohtsuki, 2008; Manapat
et al., 2009, 2010). The stochastic simulations were initiated with - 400 monomers (corresponding to
a concentration of- 10 mM in a protocell approximately 50-100 nm in diameter). For the parameters
given above as estimates for the RNA world, we measured Ck, D, and the length distribution after
the reactors reached steady-state. While the stochastic results are most relevant to prebiotic protocells,
we used the deterministic results to understand diversity (as the calculation is more tractable in the
deterministic case). We examined both possible sources of bias: (1) biased reactivity (kco, differing
10-fold between the monomers 0 and 1) and (2) biased abundance (again a 10-fold difference between
monomers).
In the absence of template-directed ligation, both sources of bias resulted in an exponential re-
lationship between length and abundance at steady-state, with the scaling determined by the ratio
rcon. We give an analytical proof of this relationship in the supplementary information. However,
template-directed ligation dramatically skews the distribution toward longer lengths (Figure 2(a)) .
Since ribozymes and aptamers typically have a length of 30 bases or greater (Ellington, 2010), this
effect could improve the chance of obtaining functional molecules simply by increasing the number
of long polymers. For example, within the range of parameters studied here (rcon = 10, rug from 0
to 106), template-directed ligation increases the mass fraction of ribozyme-length molecules (at least
30 bases long) from 0 (numerically undetectable) to more than 5%.
For sequences of a given length, template-directed ligation increases the average complexity Ck
regardless of the source of the monomer bias. When monomer abundance is biased, concatenation
alone results in relatively low average complexity, independent of the relative strength of concatenation
and hydrolysis (average Ck ~ 0.4). However, template-directed ligation generally causes an increase in
complexity (Figure 5-2(b)) . In some cases Ck increases by more than 35%. This could be primarily
the result of enhanced incorporation of the less abundant nucleotide through complementary base-
pairing to the sequences produced by concatenation, and the effect increases with rug. Outside of the
biochemically relevant parameter range, other effects can become important (see the supplementary
information). Diversity (D) closely follows the trends observed for average complexity across a range
of parameters (Figure 5-2(c)) .
When reactivities are biased, complexity depends on the rates of both concatenation and template-
directed ligation. In the absence of template-directed ligation, a system with higher concatenation
rates has higher average complexity and diversity (Figure 5-2(d)). This effect appears to be a con-
sequence of mass action, as the less reactive monomer is incorporated into polymers when concate-
nation is fast relative to hydrolysis. A simplified analytical model demonstrates this effect (see the
supplementary information). At a given concatenation rate, template-directed ligation further in-
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Figure 5-2: Length, sequence complexity, and diversity of sequences at steady-state. (a) Length
distribution of RNA molecules for different rates of template-directed ligation (rlig varying from 0 to
106) while the relative rate of concatenation and hydrolysis is kept constant (rcon = 10). (b) Average
sequence complexity Ck versus concatenation ratio reon when monomer composition is biased (a 9-
fold difference in base abundance). The data are plotted for different template-directed ligation ratios
(rug = 0,2 x 104, 1 x 106). The inset (Ck vs. ruig) shows the template-directed ligation effect at a low
concatenation rate (rcon = 4). (c) Diversity vs. average complexity in deterministic simulations for
rcon between 1 and 1000 and rug between 1 and 10 7 when monomor abundance is biased (blue) and
when monomer reactivity is biased (red). (d) Average sequence complexity Ck versus concatenation
ratio reon when monomer reactivity is biased (a 19-fold difference between the kcon's of the two bases).
The data are plotted for different template-directed ligation ratios (rug = 0,2 x 104, 1 x 106). The
inset (Ck vs. rug) shows the template-directed ligation effect at a low concatenation rate (rcon = 4).
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creases complexity and diversity (Figure 5-2(d)), which is particularly noticable when rcon is small.
Since template-directed ligation, like concatenation, increases the amount of bond formation relative
to hydrolysis, one possible explanation for this effect is also simply mass action. However, another
hypothesis is that template-directed ligation preferentially propagates the information content of com-
plex sequences.
To address this hypothesis, we studied the dependence of ligation efficiency on template com-
plexity in an experimental system. Binary DNA templates of varying complexity were mixed with
an excess of radiolabelled 5'-phosphorylated random binary DNA octamers (see the supplementary
information). Bond formation was catalyzed by cyanogen bromide after an annealing step (James and
Ellington, 1997). In this system, hydrolysis and non-templated concatenation are negligible, and the
composition of the templates and random oligonucleotides permits unambiguous determination of
the efficiency of ligation on the specified template. Ligation reactions were analyzed by polyacry-
lamide gel electrophoresis to quantify the formation of radioactive higher molecular weight products
(Figure 5-3(a)). If template-directed ligation acted only as another form of concatenation (increasing
average Ck via mass action), ligation efficiency should not depend on the complexity of the template.
Instead, we found a positive correlation between complexity and product formation (Figure 5-3(b)).
We can understand this effect as follows. A long sequence with high Ck generally contains several
unique subsequences that can act as templates, whereas a sequence with low Ck has fewer unique
subsequences. If there is a limited number of sequences (e.g., in a protocell), the probability that a
given sequence acts as a template would depend on the number of different subsequences it contains.
Therefore, templates with high Ck would ligate more products, increasing the average complexity
of the pool. We found that experimentally increasing the concentration of templates increased the
yield, confirming that templates were the limiting factor (see the supplementary information).
Although our simulations are simplifications of actual RNA systems (e.g., we did not include the
dependence of the ligation rate on annealing length or secondary structure), our experiments with
this binary system show that template-directed ligation can increase sequence complexity above and
beyond the increase obtained from the mass-action effects of concatenation.
5.4 Methods
5.4.1 Simulations
The simulations were performed on the Odyssey Cluster of the FAS Research Computing Group at
Harvard University. The stochastic simulation was based on the Gillespie algorithm. The total num-
ber of monomers in the system was typically limited to 400. During each iteration, an exponential
waiting time was generated before a single reaction-concatenation, template-directed ligation, or
hydrolysis-occurred according to the relative probabilities of all the possible reactions. Characteris-
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Figure 5-3: Relationship between template complexity and ligation efficiency. (a) Polyacrylamide
gel showing higher molecular weight products for different templates (1 yM template with random
octamers). The "0" indicates the reaction without templates. (b) Product yield (fraction of octamers
incorporated into higher molecular weight bands) vs. the complexity C4 of the template. The red
line is the least squares line-of-best-fit (R2 -0.9).
tics of the system (length, complexity, etc.) were recorded at steady-state, and multiple runs enabled
us to calculate standard errors for these measurements. The deterministic simulation kept track of the
abundances of all possible sequences as the system evolved. The system was truncated at a maximum
polymer length (typically 12) for computational tractability (i.e., polymers of the maximum length
could not undergo further concatenation or ligation). Complexity and diversity were computed
using steady-state abundances.
5.4.2 Experimental protocol
Template-directed ligation was carried out following a previously published procedure (James and
Ellington, 1997). Each reaction contained 1-2 yM DNA template and 16 yM random radiolabelled
DNA octamers. The template oligonucleotides were composed of C and T and had length 32-40.
The octamers were composed of A and G. The sequences were annealed by heating to 95 degrees
followed by cooling on the benchtop and incubation on ice. Reactions were initiated by addition
of cyanogen bromide. Reaction products were analyzed by polyacrylamide gel electrophoresis and
quantified by phosphorimaging.
5.5 Conclusion
In summary, our simulations and experiments indicate that complexity and diversity in the RNA
world could have emerged despite large biases in monomer abundance and reactivity. Template-
directed ligation was particularly important in pushing the system towards long, complex sequences,
suggesting that the ability to template substantially improves the chances of generating a ribozyme.
The average complexity is closely linked to the diversity of the pool, and small changes in these
values can lead to an exponentially large increase in the area of sequence space that is explored. The
accessible sequence space also becomes more interesting as Ck increases in the sense that energetic
stability, likely a prerequisite for functional activity, is correlated with Ck.
It is generally assumed that the emergence of ribozymes was the result of natural selection for
replication in a pool of RNA sequences (Orgel, 2004b; Briones et al., 2009). Here we have shown
how the pool might have produced long, complex, energetically stable sequences as a consequence
of the chemical mechanisms at work in a system with template-directed ligation. Despite the biased
synthesis of RNA and related polymers, template-directed ligation might have nevertheless led di-
rectly to a diverse set of complex sequences, setting a favorable stage for the generation of the first
ribozymes even before the onset of natural selection.
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Appendix A
Emergence of complex, stable, and diverse sequences in the RNA world
Supplementary information
Julien Derr, Michael L. Manapat, Sudha Rajanani, Kevin Leu,
IsaacJoseph, Martin A. Nowak, and Irene A. Chen
A.1 Effects of bias on sequence complexity distribution
We performed computer simulations to determine the influence that a typical bias has on the com-
plexity Ck. Each sequence was generated by randomly assigning a nucleotide value (0 or 1) to each
position according to a Bernoulli process. For the biased case, the probability of incorporation of a
0 was p = 0.9 and the probability of incorporation of a 1 was 1 - p = 0.1. (This corresponds to a
9-fold bias in monomer abundance.) The complexity Ck was measured with k = 4. The results are
shown in Figure A-1. The 10% bias moves the distribution from (Ck) = 0.94 to (Ck) ~ 0.43. The
drop in complexity is substantial, showing that achieving high complexity in a biased environment is
not trivial.
A.2 Model details
A.2.1 Stochastic Model
We begin with a collection of NI monomers (polymers of length 1), No of which are O's and N1
of which are 1's. The total number of monomers in the system, N1, controls the volume of our
model reactor. Thus, No/NJ and N1 /NJ can be interpreted as the initial concentrations of 0 and 1,
respectively.
At any given time, the system consists of a variable number n of polymers, which we will denote
by P1,..., Pn. At time 0, P1,..., PNo are all equal to the monomer 0, and PNo+1,... , PNI are all equal
to the monomer 1.
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Figure A-1: Probability of generating a sequence of length 50 with a given complexity in the biased
case (red) and the unbiased case (blue). The complexity is measured with k = 4.
The various reactions occur with the following rates. When the active binding site is a 0, con-
catenation occurs with rate a. When the active binding site is a 1, concatenation occurs with rate b.
Hydrolysis occurs with rate h (per bond). Template-directed ligation occurs with rate c.
The system evolves according to the Gillespie algorithm. In each iteration of this algorithm, an
exponential waiting time with parameter A is generated, where A is the sum of the rates of all the
possible reactions. A particular reaction is then chosen to occur at random based on its rate relative
to the other possible reactions. Suppose there are instantaneously n polymers in the system. For a
given polymer Pi, three reactions are possible:
Hydrolysis of one of its bonds, each bond having an equal probability h of being hydrolyzed. If
hydrolysis occurs, two fragments result. The first fragment remains labelled Pi, while the second
fragment becomes the new polymer Pn+1. (Figure A-2(a))
Concatenation with another polymer, with rate a /N if the reactive site of Pi is a 0 and rate b/NJ if
the reactive site of Pi is a 1. If concatenation occurs with Pi and Pj, the new polymer is labelled
Pi, Pk is replaced by Pk+1 for k = j,...,n - 1, and Pn is removed. (Figure A-2(b))
Template-directed ligation of two polymers, with rate c/N' x n,, where n, is the number of liga-
tion sites on the template. If ligation happens between the template Pr and the two fragments
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Figure A-2: Schematic representation of the basic reactions of the model. (a) Concatenation. (b)
Hydrolysis. (c) Template-directed ligation.
P, and Pt, Ps is extend to P, + Pt,Pm is replaced with Pm+1 for m = t,...,n - 1, and Pn is
removed. The polymer Pi can participate in the ligation reaction either as a template or as one
of the fragments that are joined. (Figure A-2(c))
To ensure that the reaction rates depend only on monomer concentration and not on the number of
monomers in the system, the rate constants in the model are normalized by N1. The normalization is
linear in N1 for concatenation but quadratic for template-directed ligation. See Section A.5 for more
information.
After each reaction, we measure various observables X of interest (e.g., the complexity). If we
denote the exponential waiting time before the reaction by 6t, this measurement makes a contribution
ofweight 6t to the long-term average of X. To check when equilibrium has been reached, we measure
the observables at successive, exponentially distributed time steps (times 0 and 1, then 1 and 2, then
2 'and 4, etc.): steady-state is determined to have been reached when (Xt+1 - Xt)/Xt+1 is less than
100
some fixed tolerance (typically 0.1%).
A.2.2 Deterministic Model
The deterministic model is the natural analogue of the stochastic one. As before, let a be the con-
catenation rate
i+ O i0j
and b the concatenation rate
i +1j ilj,
where i and j are any sequences (possibly null). Let h be the rate at which any given bond in a
polymer is hydrolyzed.
We first formulate the system without ligation, so concatenation and hydrolysis are the only
permissible processes. Let xi denote the abundance of sequence i. We will now determine ti, the
time derivative of the abundance.
Let Pi denote collection of all sequences that have i as a prefix and Si the collection of all sequences
that have i as a suffix. Then we recover i from hydrolysis of longer sequences at rate
h ( x+ , Xk).
\jsPi kESk
Let 1 be the length of i. There are I - 1 bonds in sequence i, so i is lost due to hydrolysis at rate
h(l - 1)xi.
The total contribution to i due to hydrolysis is thus
h (Ex; + (7 xk - h(l - 1)xi.
\jE Pi kESk
Let Ri,O denote the collection of all suffixes of i with leading bit 0, and for m E Ri,O, let Li(m)
be the prefix of i such that the concatenation of Li(m) and m (in that order) is i. Similarly, let Ri,1
denote the collection of all suffixes of i with leading bit 1, and for n E Ri,1, let Li(n) be the prefix of i
such that the concatenation of Li(n) and n (in that order) is i. Then i is formed by the concatenation
of shorter sequences at rate
a E XLi(m)Xm + b T XLi(n)xn.
mCERj,0 nERi,1
Now let Z denote the collection of all sequence with leading bit 0, 0 the collection of all sequence
with leading bit 1, and A the collection of all sequences. If the leading bit of i is 0, let d = a.
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Otherwise, let d = b. Then i is lost due to concatenation at rate
axi xp + bxi x + dxi xr.
pEZ qEO rEA
The total contribution to :i due to concatenation is thus
a ( XLi(m)Xm + b (j XLi(n)xn - axi I Xp - bxi ( xq - dxi E Xr.
mGRj,0  ncRij,1  pZ qEO rEA
When only hydrolysis and concatenation are possible, we therefore have
ti =h xj+ xk -h(l -1)xi
\jEPi kcSk )
+a E XLi(m)Xm+b ( xLi(n)Xn
mCERj,0 n6 Ri,1
-axi ( xP - bx; ( xq - dxi T Xr.
pEZ qcO rGA
For the purposes of simulation, we must impose an arbitrary limit on sequence length, i.e., we
do not allow there to be sequences longer than N. We can make the system above reflect this by (1)
omitting sequences longer than N from all the collections and (2) omitting sequences longer than
n - I from the collections Z, 0, and A (so those collections become dependent on i).
Now we add template-directed ligation to the system. Let c be the ligation rate. For each sequence
i, let Fi denote the collection of triples (u, v, w) such that sequence u (the template) catalyzes the
ligation of v and w to form i. (While the annealing length is not explicitly included in the formulation
of the system, it determines which triples can be in Fi and is thus implicitly one of the parameters.)
Then i is formed by ligation at rate
c xuxvxw.
(u,v,w)EFj
Let Ri denote the collection of all triples of the form (y, i, z) or (y, z, i), i.e., a triple in which i is one
of the ligation reactants (but not the template). Then i is lost due to ligation at rate
c ( xyza
(y,z,a ) c Ri
where at least one of z and a is equal to i. When i acts as a template, its abundance does not change and
thus there is no need to include its role as a template in the formulation of ti. The total contribution
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ligation makes to ti is hence
c T xuxvxw -c (7 xyxzxa4.
( u,v,w )6Fi ( y,z,a ) E Ri
As before, these terms will be adjusted in practice to reflect the length limitation.
With hydrolysis, concatenation, and ligation, the full system is as follows:
time derivative of i's abundance
formation by hydrolysis
loss due to hydrolysis
formation by concatenation
loss due to concatenation
formation by ligation
loss due to ligation
h x;+ 7xXk
\jsPi kESk
h(I -- 1)xi
+aE xLi(m)xm + b YxLi(n)xn
m{Ri,0 nERi,1
-axi ( xp - bxi T Xq - dxi E Xr
pCZ qcO0 rc-A
(u,v,w)EFi{ -c (yza)cR-
We simulate this system until equilibrium has been reached and then compute the desired functions
of the equilibrium distribution (complexity, diversity, etc.).
A.3 Analytical understanding
A.3.1 Size distribution
No ligation, and a = b
We want to compute p(l), the probability that a polymer randomly selected from the reactor has
length 1. In this simple case, we just have two parameters: B is the effective concatenation rate (see
below) and h is the hydrolysis rate.
There are two ways of consuming a polymer of size 1: concatenation (with rate p(l)B) or hydrolysis
(with rate (1 - 1)hp(l)). There are also two ways of creating a polymer of size 1: concatenation
of smaller fragments (with rate 1/2 El- Bp(i)p(l - i)) or hydrolysis of bigger fragments (with rate
2 E'1+1 hp(i)). At steady-state the detailed balance equation
1-1 o
Bp(l) + (I - 1)hp(l) = 1/2L Bp(i)p(l - i) +2 ( hp(i).
i=1 i=l+1
(A.2)
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(A. 1)
should hold. If we rewrite the same detailed balance equation for polymers of length I + 1 and then
subtract the two equations, we obtain
B '-
[p(l + 1) - p(l)](lh + B) +hp(l) = 2 p(i)[p(l +1 -i) - p(l - i)]
i=1 (A.3)
+ B p(l) p(1) - 2hp(l + 1).
If we guess an exponential solution of the form p(l) = ae# , we obtain
2h (A.4)
B
p3= -log I+ B). (A.5)
We can verify that this solution is properly normalized, i.e., that S = 1, where S is the sum of all
probabilities:
S -a-=1. (A.6)
i=1 i=o 1+a
The effective rate B reflects the average concentration of polymers in the pool. B is related to the
absolute concatenation rate Bo = bh by the equation
B = Bo , (A.7)
no
where (n) is the average number of polymers at steady-state and no is the initial number of monomers.
The average length of a polymer at steady-state is thus (1) = no/ (n). We can write (1) as a function
of an infinite sum depending on a and P and express B accordingly:
1 Bo(1 - eP)2B = Bo 1 = O (A.8)
at ,iem' aeP
We then rewrite equations A.4 and A.5 to obtain:
1
# = log(X).
where X is the solution of X2 - X(2 +2/b) +1 = 0, X < 1, and b = B.
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No ligation, and a 7 b
The bias a : b does not change the exponential shape of the distribution, but it does change the
effective concatenation rate: 2aB is the concatenation rate for zeros, and 2bB = 2(1 - a)B is the
concatenation rate for ones. We can write the dynamics of the average population of zeros and ones
(no and n1), assuming that hydrolysis gives as many reactive zeros as reactive ones (the term (no, ni)):
1
no = -2aBno + (no, ni), (A.9)
1
1 = 2(1 - a)Bn1 + (no, n1 ), (A.10)2
which give the steady state equilibrium
no 1 - a .(A. 11)
n I a
We can relate this to the previous section by computing the effective concatenation rate
Beff = 2Bnoa + n1(1 - a) (A.12)
no + n1
which is equivalent to
Beff = 4Ba(1 - a). (A.13)
Average length
Without ligation, we can compute the average length, which we find to be 1X, or
b
K /)-1+2b - 1
where b = 4a(1 - a)Bo/h. This analytical calculation agrees very well with the results of the simu-
lation (see Figure A-3).
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Figure A-3: The average length distribution as a function of the concatenation rate (relative to
hydrolysis) for a typically biased system (a = 0.05). The analytic calculations agree well with the
simulations.
Ligation
Rewriting the master equation (A.2) to include ligation gives
1 -1 o
Bp(l) + (I - 1)hp(l) (Bp(i)p(l - i) + 2 Y hp(i)
1i=l+1
+ E cfp p(i)p(j)(j - 21a + 1)p(l)
i la;j 21a
11-la
+ 2 cfpp(i)p( - i)p(j)(j - 21a +1),
i=la j 21a
where la denotes the annealing length. The inclusion of the sum from la to 1 - la in the sum from
1 to 1 - 1 yields a constant term, so the solution is no longer exponential. This explains the skew of
the resulting distribution; presumably the solution to this master equation would determine the skew
of the distribution.
A.3.2 Mass action effect
Here we present a simple model that gives us an analytical understanding of the effect that concatena-
tion rates have on the population entropy of sequences of a given length. Our model consists of two
types of monomers, 0 and 1, and two types of dimers, 00 and 11. Monomers can be concatenated
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to form dimers, and dimers can be hydrolyzed into their constituent monomers:
0 +0-+ 00, 00 - 2 -0,
1+1 -411, 11-4 2 -1.
Concatenation of two 0's to form the dimer 00 occurs at rate a. Concatenation of two 1's to form
the dimer 11 occurs at rate b. Both dimers are hydrolyzed at rate h. We assume that dimers are
homogeneous in their constituents, but simulations suggest that this restriction does not affect the
qualitative features we wish to establish with this model.
We can formulate the chemistry described above with the following system of ordinary differential
equations, where xi is the abundance of sequence i:
,to =-2axo + 2hxoo
,1= -2bxl + 2hxn1
0= ax2 - hxoo 0 ~(A. 15)
211 = bx2 - hxn
1 = xo + 2xoo
1 = x1 + 2x 11
The last two equations guarantee that there are an equal number of 0's and 1's in the system.
At equilibrium, to = 0, so ax*2 = hx, where a * denotes a quantity's value at equilibrium.
Letting a' = a/h, we have a'x*2 = x*0 . Since
xo + 2xoo = 1, (A.16)
we obtain the relation
x* + 2a'x*2 = 1. (A.17)
Solving this yields
V8a' +1 - 1
xU 4a' (A.18)
Similarly, we have
V8b' + 1 - 1
x 4b (A.19)
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Thus,
x- b'(v'8a'+1-1)
x* a' (v'8b' + 1--1)
b' (1/8a '+ 1 - 1) (V'8b ' + 1 + 1)
al 8b' (A. 20)a') 8b'
b' 64a'b' + 8a' + 8b' + 1 + 8a' +1 8b'+ 1+ 1
8a' )V b2 +V b'2 ~ b2 +b,'
Now let a', b' -+oo while keeping the ratio a'/b' fixed. Then from the expression above, we see that
-+ . (A.21)
When b' > a', concatenation of 1's is faster than concatenation of 0's. Thus, there should be fewer
free 1 monomers than 0 monomers, making x /x1* large.
Since xoo = a'x0 and x1 = b'x , when a', b' -+ o with a'/b' fixed, we have
. K 4 _ _1. b (A.22)
We conclude that increasing the absolute concatenation rates drives the population of dimers towards
an equal distribution of 00 and 11. This is tantamount to saying that fast concatenation increases the
population entropy of dimers. Indeed, the entropy of the population is maximized in the limit of
infinitely fast concatenation.
Figure A-4(a) shows the percentage of monomers that have been incorporated into dimers at
equilibrium as a function of the concatenation rate B/h when a = 0.2 and b = 0.8. This bias in
reactivity favors the polymerization of 1's. The percentage of O's in dimers is in light blue and the
percentage of l's in dimers is in dark blue. The ratio of these two quantities is in red. We can view
this ratio as a proxy for the population entropy: when it is very small (< 1) or very large (> 1),
the population distribution is skewed towards the dimer 00 or the dimer 11. When it is close to 1,
there are a roughly equal number of 00's and 11's, making the population entropy high. As the figure
shows, the ratio converges to 1 as B/h -* oo.
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Figure A-4(b) shows the analogous figure when the complete set of reactions is possible:
0+0-+00, 00 -2 0,
1+1 11, 11 2 -1,
1 + 0 10, 01 0 + 1,
0+1-401, 10 - 1+ 0.
In this case, the key quantity converges to 1 in the limit of high B/h as well.
A.4 Competing effects
Entropy decreases when kcofnco/kh 1
When considering biased composition for a wide parameter range, (k co/kh > 1, see Figure A-5),
we observe that template-directed ligation can actually decrease the complexity, indicating that some
mechanism favors low entropy sequences in this parameter range. This occurs in a limited regime
but indicates the presence of some effects that counter the ones we describe in the main text.
One possible explanation for the favoring of low entropy sequences at very high ligation rates
is that low entropy sequences may be more robust to hydrolysis. A low entropy sequence (mostly
1s) would be in presence of a complementary equivalent (mostly Os). In this extreme parameter
range, ligation dominates, and when hydrolysis is low (kconco /kh > 1), hydrolysis of one of these
two polymers will be immediately repaired by template-directed ligation on the other. There are
more ways for this to occur on a low entropy template, so this mechanism might therefore favor low
entropy sequences.
The extent of this effect is apparently limited. As kconc/kh -+ co, entropy increases towards the
same limit as for kiig = 0, as the system essentially comprises one polymer. While these parameters
may not be biochemically relevant, this additional phenomenon illustrates the complicated effects
that occur within even a relatively simple model.
A.5 Parameters ranges
A.5.1 Biologically relevant range
Our choice of parameter ranges was determined by the experimental literature (see Table A.1). In
general, bond formation in these reactions is slower than template-substrate annealing, so kuig/kcon
depends on the activation chemistry, and the rate of template-directed ligation is theoretically limited
by the rate of annealing (Calderone and Liu, 2004). The backbone conformation (A form vs. B
form) appears to be less important than activation chemistry in determining the rate of template-
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Figure A-4: The percentage of monomers that have been incorporated into dimers at equilibrium
as a function of the concatenation rate B/h when a = 0.2 and b = 0.8. This bias in reactivity favors
the polymerization of 1's. The percentage of O's in dimers is in light blue and the percentage of 1's
in dimers is in dark blue. The ratio of these two quantities is in red. We can view this ratio as a
proxy for the population entropy-the closer it is to 1, the higher the population entropy. Results
are shown for the simplified system (a) and the full system (b).
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Reactants
2-MeImpG
DNA trimers(carbodiimide activation)
Oligoribonucleotides (triphosphate)
ImpdG, DNA template
ImpdG, RNA template
0.09 M-- h-'
0.02 M- 1 s-1
3i0.8 M- 1 h-1
kiig
430 M-2 h-1
1700 M- 2 S-1
1.3 x 10-' M--2 h-1
3i0.3 x 108 M- 2 h-
2 x 108 M- 2 h-1
6 x 10-3 h-1
2±1 x 10- 5 h-1
Reference
(Kanavarioti and White, 1987)
(Sievers and von Kiedrowski, 1994)
(Rohatgi et al., 1996)
This work
This work
Table A.1: Rate constants for concatenation, template-directed ligation, and hydrolysis.
I kcon
1i co/k 0 --0.6 ki C o -con="E4 -
kigCo/kcon=1 E6
0.55 -
0.5
0.45
0.4
0.35
10 100 1000
kconco/kh
Figure A-5: Figure 2 of the main article with a wider parameter range.
directed ligation, as shown by our comparison of an RNA template vs. DNA template. However,
the backbone strongly influences the rate of hydrolysis, so for our modeling we focus on kcof/kh for
an RNA ligation system.
A.5.2 Mapping simulation parameters and experimentally determined rate constants
We now link the measured reaction rates (klig, kcon, kh) to the computational parameters (B, c, and
h).
Concatenation We have the chemical reaction
A+B -"o AB, with d = kcon[A] [B].dt
Let n be the number of polymers in the system, V the volume of the reactor, V the average
volume per nucleotide (Vo = 1/co, where co is the initial concentration of nucleotides), and
N1 the total number of monomers. We can compare the individual rates in both the real and
simulated systems:
n B B
kcon x = n = /Vo n.V N1  V/V 0
The first expression corresponds to the real system and the second and third to the simulation.
Therefore,
B =kcon
Vo
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Template-directed ligation The same reasoning applies for the equation
A+B+T klig AB+T, with dt =kAg[A][B][T].
We conclude that
kiig
c = VS'8
Hydrolysis The rate per bond is directly extrapolated from the rate of hydrolysis of nmers. In the
first approximation, we did not consider the effects of secondary structure. We also did not
consider product inhibition, since this is less important for a promiscuous system (Lincoln and
Joyce, 2009; Ellington, 2009) and can be circumvented by spatial organization (Luther et al.,
1998).
Concentration The concentration is an important parameter. Here are typical values of the concen-
tration used in experiments:
* 20 mM, template-directed polymerization from monomers (Lohrmann et al., 1980)
* 10 mM, template-directed polymerization from monomers (Kozlov et al., 1999)
* 25-50 mM nucleotide equivalents, template-directed ligation of 6mers to form 12mers
(Usher and McHale, 1976)
* 50 mM monomers, 50 mM template, template-directed polymerization from monomers
(Kanavarioti and White, 1987)
* 66 mM nucleotide equivalents, template-directed ligation from 3mers to form 6mers (von
Kiedrowski, 1986)
* few mM nucleotide equivalents, template-directed ligation from random 6mers or 12mers
(James and Ellington, 1997)
* 15 mM, non-templated polymerization of monomers (Miyakawa and Ferris, 2003)
A.6 Experimental methods
Oligonucleotides. Desalted DNA oligonucleotides were obtained from Eurofins MWG Operon
(Huntsville, AL) or Sigma-Aldrich (St. Louis, MO) and used without further purification. Random
octamers, as 5' -RRRRRRRG and 5'-RRRRRRRA, where R denotes a purine, were mixed in an equimolar
mixture and phosphorylated by T4 polynucleotide kinase (New England Biolabs, Ipswich, MA) and
[7- 2P]-ATP at 37 degrees for 1 hour. 0.5 mM ATP was then added and the reaction was incubated
overnight to ensure maximum phosphorylation. T4 PNK was inactivated by incubating at 65 degrees
for 20 minutes. Template oligonucleotide sequences are as follows:
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40-mer templates:
T40: 5'-TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
2Tran: 5'-CTCTCTTCCCTTCTTTTTCCCCTTTTCTTTTCTCCTCCCC
Rep2T: 5'-CTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCT
Rep6T: 5'-TCCTTCTCCTTCTCCTTCTCCTTCTCCTTCTCCTTCTCCT
Rep12T: 5'-TCTTCCTTTCCCTCTTCCTTTCCCTCTTCCTTTCCCTCTT
Rep20T: 5'-TCCTTCCCTTTTTTCCCCTCTCCTTCCCTTTTTTCCCCTC
3Tran: 5'-CCTCCTCTTCCTTTCCCCCTCCCTCTCTCTTTTCCTTCTC
Template-directed chemical ligation reactions. The ligation protocol was based on a previously
published method (James and Ellington, 1997). Reagents were purchased from Sigma-Aldrich (St.
Louis, MO) unless otherwise specified. Briefly, reactions contained random octamers (16 yM), tem-
plate (1-2 pM), 0.23 M 2-(N-morpholino)ethanesulfonic acid buffer (pH 7.4), and 19 mM Mgl 2
in 4.5 uL of aqueous solution. The solution was heated to 95 degrees for 3 minutes and then cooled
to room temperature on the benchtop for 15 minutes. The solution was then placed on ice for 5
minutes. 0.5 yL of CNBr solution (5M in acetonitrile) was added to the reaction. The reaction
was quenched by addition of 100 yL of ethanol after 1 minute. 0.5 yL of GlycoBlue (Ambion,
Austin, TX) was added and the DNA was precipitated for >1 hour at -20 degrees. The mixture was
centrifuged at 12,000g at 4 degrees for 30 minutes. Supernatant was removed and the pellets were
dried on the benchtop overnight. The pellets were resuspended in 50 YL of water and aliquots were
mixed with loading buffer for electrophoresis through a 24% polyacrylamide gel following a stan-
dard protocol. Molecular weight markers were obtained by radioactive phosphorylation of known
oligonucleotides. Gels were exposed to a phosphorimaging screen (GE Healthcare, Piscataway, NJ)
and the screen was scanned by a Typhoon TRIO Variable Mode Imager (Piscataway, NJ). Band in-
tensity was quantified in ImageQuant. Products were identified as bands with molecular weight > 8
bases. Yield was calculated as the product band intensity divided by the sum of product band intensity
and octamer band intensity.
Template-directed chemical ligation with a limited subset of oligonucleotides. Ligation was
performed as above except with the following substrates. The templates and octamers were designed
such that a limited number (25, less than the theoretically possible set of 28) of octamers would be
complementary to all 8mer subsequences within the entire set of templates.
Octamers:
5'-GGGGAGGA
5'-GGGAGGAG
5'-GGAGGAGA
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Figure A-6: Increasing the concentration of template increases ligation yield. (a) Polyacrylamide
gel of representative reactions of the octamer subset with 32mer templates of different complexity
(see Methods). Template concentration was 1 uM. (b) Yield of ligation for reactions at a template
concentration of 1 uM (black circles and line) or 2 uM (gray triangles and line).
5'-GAGGAGAA
5' -AGGAGAAA
5'-GGAGAAAA
5' -GAGAAAAG
5' -AGAAAAGA
5'-GAAAAGAA
5'-AAAAGAAG
5' -AAAGAAGA
5'-AAGAAGAG
5'-AGAAGAGG
5'-AAAAAAAA
5'-AGAGAGAG
5' -GAAGAGGA
5'-AAGAGGAG
5'-AGAGGAGA
5'-AGGAGAAG
5'-GGAGAAGA
5'-GAGAAGAG
5'-AGGAAGGA
5'-GGAAGGAA
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5'-GAAGGAAG
5'-AAGGAAGG
32-mer templates:
T32: 5'-TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
Rep2_32T: 5'-CTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCTCT
Rep4_32T: 5'-TCCTTCCTTCCTTCCTTCCTTCCTTCCTTCCT
Rep8_32T: 5'-CCTCTTCTCCTCTTCTCCTCTTCTCCTCTTCT
Ran32T: 5'-CTCTTCTTTTCTCCTCTTCTTTTCTCCTCCCC
Measurement of kcon, klig, and kh in a DNA analog. Experiments were performed according
to Rajamani et al. (2010). A fluorescently labelled DNA primer terminated by a 3'-amino-2',3'-
dideoxynucleotide
5'-GGGATTAATACGACTCACTC-NH_2
was reacted with deoxyguanosine 5'-phosphorimidazolide (ImpdG) in the presence or absence of a
template DNA oligonucleotide,
5'-AGTGATCTCGAGTGAGTCGTATTAATCCC
to determine kcon and kiig. The primer alone was incubated in the reaction buffer to determine kh-
The RNA templated reaction conditions were the same except for the primer sequence
5'-GGGATTAATACGACTCACTG-NH_2
and the template sequence
5'-agtgatctccagtgagtcgtattaatccc
Reactions were analyzed by denaturing polyacrylamide gel electrophoresis and quantified as previ-
ously described. The initial rate of primer extension or degradation over time was fit to a straight
line to obtain the apparent rate constant. See Figure A-7.
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Efefct of template on the rate of incorporation of ImpdG across dC
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Figure A-7: The constants kcon, klig, and kh in a DNA analog. Polyacrylamide gel of the templated
reaction (a) or non-templated reaction (b) over time. (c) Primer extension over time for templated
(open circles) or non-templated (closed circles) reactions. (d) Primer degradation over time.
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